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ANALYZING OPPORTUNITIES FOR MORAL GROWTH IN AND
THROUGH CHILDREN'S LITERATURE

by



JUDITH MARIE VAN MANEN

A THESIS

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The undersigned certify that they have read, and recommend to the Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research, for acceptance, a thesis entitled Analyzing Opportunities for Moral Growth in and through Children's Literature submitted by Judith Marie van Manen in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Education.

ABSTRACT

The purpose of this study was to investigate how selected children's books may provide for opportunities of moral growth in the child's reading experience. To this end the study undertook a multi-tiered approach whereby the stance systematically shifted from a predominantly theoretic or thematic orientation (chapters II, III, IV) towards an increasingly concrete or phenomenological perspective of moral growth in the reading experience (chapters V, VI). Consequently, the investigation started out with an attempt to develop analytic models which were called "clue structures" (chapter III), designed to function as interpretive devices in the task of understanding the potential value of a piece of children's literature for providing the child with moral growth experiences. The specially designed clue structures were validated by demonstrating how it is indeed possible to select and understand the potential reading experience of a story on the basis of a particular kind of moral growth experience (chapter IV). It was argued, however, that any conceptual approach to the understanding of a reading experience of a moral kind necessarily glosses over the very question of what such moral growth experience consists of. In order to deepen out the significance of this question, one of the moral growth models (the moral emotional approach) was selected in order to investigate what it means to ask the question of the empirical and phenomenological nature of the moral emotional experience (chapter V). The writings of Scheler were found especially helpful to search for the phenomenological or lived roots of the experience which we call moral emotional. It became clear,

however, that the investigation into the lived aspects of the moral emotional experience yields interpretive clues which are more narrative than conceptual and thus less easily suited for fitting into a kind of schematic interpretive model of the earlier developed clue structures. Finally, the study moved towards a focus which was even more concrete by developing a "theoretical" perspective which posed that we can only acquire a closer understanding of the lived dimension of the moral emotional quality of the child's reading experience by attending to the clues contained in the language by way of which children give accounts of their reading experience (chapter VI). Subsequently, two illustrative examples were provided which aimed at exploring the phenomenological implications of this perspective. These explorations (one of the reading experiences debriefed in group discussions and the other of the reading experience of a single child) were offered as examples of a mundane (or "worldly") form of theorizing which may provide more phenomenological clues as to the lived quality of a moral emotional reading experience.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

| Chapter | | Page |
|---------|--|------|
| I | STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM AND ITS SIGNIFICANCE | 1 |
| | Introduction and Background | 1 |
| | Purpose of the Study | 4 |
| | The Problem | 4 |
| | Subproblems | 4 |
| | Limitations of the Study | 5 |
| | Definition of Terms | 6 |
| | Approach of the Study | 7 |
| | Significance of the Study | 10 |
| II | THEORIES OF MORAL GROWTH | 11 |
| | The Values Clarification Approach | 11 |
| | The Rational Approach | 14 |
| | The Cognitive Developmental Approach | 15 |
| | The Moral Emotional Approach | 17 |
| | Some Pedagogical Considerations of Content and Process in Moral Growth Theories | 20 |
| III | DEVELOPMENT OF THE IDEA OF CLUE STRUCTURE | 26 |
| | Knowledge as Clues | 26 |
| | Clue Structures | 28 |
| | Clue Structure—Values Clarification | 30 |
| | Clue Structure—Rational | 30 |
| | Clue Structure—Moral Development | 31 |
| | Clue Structure—Moral Emotional | 31 |

| Chapter | | Page |
|---------|--|------|
| IV | USING CLUE STRUCTURES BY WAY OF ANALYZING CHILDREN'S BOOKS | 33 |
| | The Values Clarifying Emphasis: <u>Are You</u> <u>There God? It's Me Margaret</u> by Judy Blume | 34 |
| | Sketch of the Story | 34 |
| | Clue Structure Analysis | 35 |
| | Pedagogical Considerations | 36 |
| | The Rational Emphasis: <u>The Slave Dancer</u> by Paula Fox | 37 |
| | Sketch of the Story | 37 |
| | Clue Structure Analysis | 37 |
| | Pedagogical Considerations | 40 |
| | The Cognitive Developmental Emphasis: <u>The Midnight Fox</u> by Betsy Byars | 40 |
| | Clue Structure Analysis | 41 |
| | Pedagogical Considerations | 46 |
| | The Moral Emotional Emphasis: <u>The Happy</u> <u>Prince</u> by Oscar Wilde | 47 |
| | Sketch of the Story | 47 |
| | Clue Structure Analysis | 47 |
| | Pedagogical Considerations | 50 |
| | Conclusion | 51 |
| V | FOCUSING DOWN: THE MORAL EMOTIONAL APPROACH | 53 |
| | The Concept of Empathy | 53 |
| | The Empirical-Analytic Orientation to the Study of Empathy | 56 |
| | Three Educational Frameworks for the Acquisition of Empathy | 58 |
| | Empathy as Something to be Taught | 59 |

| Chapter | | Page |
|---------|--|------|
| | Empathy is Something to be Fostered | 61 |
| | Empathy as Something to be Acquired Developmentally | 63 |
| | Conclusions of the Empirical-Analytic Orientation | 64 |
| | The Phenomenological Orientation to the Study of Empathy | 66 |
| | The Structures of Fellow-Feeling | 68 |
| | Kinds of Fellow-Feeling | 71 |
| | Conclusions of the Phenomenological Orientation | 72 |
| VI | THE READING EXPERIENCE OF THE CHILD | 76 |
| | On the Phenomenology of Reading | 76 |
| | The Personal Nature of a Reading Experience: A Group Discussion | 87 |
| | The Reading Experience of a Single Child | 94 |
| VII | CONCLUSION | 101 |
| | Summary | 101 |
| | Implications for Curriculum | 106 |
| | Recommendations for Further Research | 108 |
| | Concluding Statement | 109 |
| | BIBLIOGRAPHY | 110 |
| | APPENDIX. INTERVIEW TRANSCRIPT | 116 |

LIST OF FIGURES

| Figure | | Page |
|--------|--|------|
| 1 | Teaching for Values Clarification | 13 |
| 2 | Progression in Stages of Moral Reasoning | 16 |
| 3 | Kohlberg's Match +1 Concept | 18 |
| 4 | Comparison of Four Basic Approaches in Moral and Values Education | 25 |

Chapter I

STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM AND ITS SIGNIFICANCE

Introduction and Background

Children grow morally as they have moral experiences. And although the teacher may have little influence over the kinds of real life experiences the child undergoes, he or she can play a significant role in the kinds of literary experiences the child may encounter. In particular, literary material is eminently suited to induce the child into experiences of a moral nature. Naturally, vicarious experiences gained through literature are not of the same modality as ordinary life experiences, yet such vicarious experiences may have a powerful potential for contributing to the child's maturation and growth. There is no authoritative prescription for books that match children's emotional drives, contribute to their developmental potentials, or to their empathic betterment. Such aspects of life, however, are often an intrinsic part of literature discovered by a student on his own, or slowly revealed to him by a sensitive teacher. Charles Kingsley puts it well when he says, "Except a living man there is nothing more wonderful than a book! A message to us from human souls we never saw. And yet these arouse us, terrify us, teach us, comfort us, open their hearts as brothers."

Consequential learning in a deep moral emotional sense possibly cannot be measured in the same straightforward and direct

manner as the language items of a vocabulary or spelling test. And yet it is exactly this more profound learning that poses the fascinating questions of the relationships between language development and the language content of relevant literary texts. Paul Hazard in his book Books Children and Men talks about good books. One condition he points to is that books that are good should contain "profound morality."

Not the kind of morality which consists in believing oneself a hero because one has given two cents to a poor man, or which names as characteristics the faults peculiar to one era, or one nation, here snivelling pity, there a pietism that knows nothing of charity; somewhere else a middle class hypocrisy. Not the kind of morality that asks for no deeply felt consent, for no personal effort, and which is nothing but a rule imposed willy-nilly by the strongest. I like books that set in action truths worthy of lasting forever, and of inspiring one's whole inner life; those demonstrating that an unselfish and faithful love always ends by finding its reward, be it only in oneself; how ugly and low are envy, jealousy and greed; how people who utter only slander and lies end by coughing up vipers and toads whenever they speak. In short, I like books that have the integrity to perpetuate their own faith in truth and justice. (1944, pp. 44-45)

It is both puzzling and fascinating, for example, to reflect on the question of what it is about the language of a fairy tale by Oscar Wilde, H. C. Andersen, or the language of the great fairy tales collected by the Grimm brothers which tend to provide children with truly cathartic language experiences, while so many other and more modern stories contained in the language arts curriculum lack such profundity and depth.

Children read in school for many reasons. Generally, students are asked to read to improve their decoding, word study, and comprehension skills, to learn knowledge, information, and skills in other content areas, and for relaxation and enjoyment. Rather than

treating reading for its own sake—and of considerable importance for the child in his growth toward maturity—literature tends to become a fill-in time between more substantial subjects. But of course, reading should be more than that. For the purpose of this study, I will focus on the third type of reading that children do, or ought to do daily in school (and at home for that matter): the so-called "free reading," "library reading," or "teacher reading story time." The reading process associated with the development of reading skills, or with the learning of other subject matter is not a major consideration for the purpose of the present study. Charlotte Huck writes persuasively that "The province of literature is the human condition; life with all its feelings, thoughts and insights . . ." (1976, p. 4). A special time for the child to read stories in school is time for the child to deepen his understanding of himself and his world. It is this deepened understanding with its moral qualities and implications that is the topic for this study.

Educators have been interested in moral education since the time of Plato's The Republic and even before. Moreover, the interest within education in moral growth has blossomed during the last few decades. As a result, moral growth is subject to many interpretations. This study is, however, limited to the four broad approaches to moral growth. The approaches were chosen because they are theoretically distinct and because they have already been experimented with in the classroom (see Chapter II). Their differences in orientation and scope are broad enough to analyze the language of most books that can be seen to contain a moral growth component. The four selected approaches are (1) the

values clarification approach, (2) the rational approach to values education, (3) the cognitive developmental approach, and (4) the moral emotional approach. The intent of this study is not to discuss and critique in great depth any of the above approaches. Through reviewing the underlying assumptions and main ideas of each approach, hopefully some conclusions may be drawn about the provisions for moral growth in children's literature. A schematic comparison of the four basic approaches in moral and value education has been included in Chapter II.

Purpose of the Study

The purpose of the study is to investigate how selected children's books may provide for opportunities of moral growth in the child's lived reading experience.

The Problem

Problem statement: How can children's literature be analyzed in the way that it may provide for moral growth in the child's reading experience?

Subproblems

The following subproblems have been formulated in such a way that the above general problem statement is addressed through the pursuit of the subproblems. Each subproblem is pursued in a separate chapter.

1. What analytic device (clue structure) can be utilized to examine children's literature for its provision for moral growth experiences?

2. What kinds of theories of moral growth can be isolated for analysis and how are these theories applied to the school curriculum?

3. What would an application (i.e., analysis) of the clue structure to some selected children's books look like?

4. How can the idea of clue structure be refined in such a way that it permits a deepened analysis of a certain reading experience provided by selected books; such that the analysis develops insights beyond the confines of the method of more conventional content analysis techniques? (This question will be pursued at the hand of a selected fairy tale focussing on one theory of moral growth: the moral emotional approach.)

5. How do children, while debriefing their experiences of reading a story, provide clues about the personal nature of the lived reading experience in the very way that they speak about the moral character of the content of the story?

6. What is the lived reading experience like for a young child who reads a story to himself? And how can the child's language (talk) be seen as a source for more clues regarding the tacit nature of personal knowledge as the child is involved in a reading experience of a moral kind?

Limitations of the Study

The empirical question concerning the extent that children's literature provides for moral growth will not be pursued. Instead, the emphasis of this study is on the "provision for" aspect of curriculum.

Moral growth is defined broadly, subsuming selected approaches to moral and values education as found in the literature.

The children's literature referred to in this study will be restricted to include four books that seem to contain a moral growth component. Naturally this is largely an interpretive question. "Good" books are selected partly on the basis of my own teaching experience regarding the appeal they hold for children in the upper elementary years, grades four, five and six.

Definition of Terms

"Provision for learning" is a phrase which refers to any piece of curriculum that as a result of its manifest (rather than its instructional potential) content, form, presentation, is likely or has the potential to lead to certain kinds of learning. For example, a globe outlining the physical features of the earth has the provision for learning that the earth is spherical, that there are certain distributions of bodies of water, masses of land, and so on. (One might argue that the globe can be instructionally significant for many other potential uses—such as learning the nature of seasons, weather, etc.)

The term "moral" is not being used in strict philosophical terms. It refers here to any experience that a child may have when he is confronted with ideas, feelings, and questions involving good versus bad or right versus wrong. Included are modes of experiencing which are rational and deliberative, in line with normal moral justifications, as well as more spontaneous precognitive experiences

(which are more like moods, feelings and emotions).

The term "growth" is used rather than "development" since it is assumed that some experiences which may have a transforming quality with respect to a person's moral character are not step-wise or stage-wise developments but ought to be interpreted in the context of a child's ongoing though not necessarily continuous process of maturation.

The term "phenomenology" is used to designate the study of lived experience. The term is discussed further in Chapter VI.

Approach of the Study

In order to investigate the problem and subproblems posed, the usual research design containing a sample and instrumentation devices was considered inappropriate. It is not my intention to explore moral growth in an empirical-analytic or nomothetic frame. In other words, the aim of this study is not to gain a causal, correlational grasp of moral growth as a dependent variable in human behavior and child development nor to find predictive and explanatory measures which eventually would claim to bring moral growth under the effective influence of reading or language arts educators. Rather, the focus of this study is on the curriculum aspect of the "provision for" opportunities of moral growth experiences as found in the way that certain books may present themselves to the reader. Knowledge that explores the significance of moral growth from a more phenomenological frame aims to deepen out the personal meaning aspects, the verstehende (Dilthey, 1976) or the existential structure of this kind of reading experience. The approach of this study will be determined by the

clue structures as they have been developed conceptually and structurally into four types. In subsequent chapters the idea of clue structure is interpreted increasingly phenomenologically so that the interpretive analysis also requires a more phenomenological methodology.

In order to be able to assess whether any particular children's book reflects a philosophy that is in line with a moral growth or a value theory, such as the moral developmental, the values clarification, the moral emotional, or the rational approach, a clue structure could be developed. By a clue structure is meant an analytic device that can be used to interpret or analyze a literary text for the way in which it provides for opportunities of moral growth. The clue structure may help to identify what concepts and concerns should be dealt with in questions and discussions. Eventually the clue structures would need to be elaborated in such a manner that the interpretation process would permit corroborative critique (which is not the same as inter-judge and intra-judge reliability). In other words, a "friendly reading" by a third person should be able, on the basis of the clue structures, to corroborate the correctness of a particular interpretation made, including the educational consequences which follow from such interpretation.

From a pedagogic point of view, the kinds of experiences and activities that the child has in school should help him grow toward mature, emancipatory personhood. The idea of clue structure is a way for the teacher of seeking interpretive access to the possible forms of personal knowing in a child's life through concrete situation-

analysis and the analysis of curriculum materials (e.g., children's literature). The concept of clue structure may be extended to include what a great person in a particular field of personal development (e.g., moral growth) exemplifies. For example, the philosopher Socrates (his "know thyself") might represent aspects of the values clarifying form of life; Bertrand Russell could be the edifying example of the rational-moral man; the great author Jean Genet might be seen as the moral developmental ideal, and Martin Buber could offer the ideal exemplifying life of moral emotional maturity. Intimate and edifying understandings of the lives of "great" men and women is a kind of indwelling. The teacher who contemplates and reflects on the biographies of exemplary lives of great individuals has access to a kind of knowing which transcends the vulgar and flattened experience of decision making as encountered in current and traditional forms of decision making, where curriculum activities are approached in a more empiricist, means-ends, instrumental attitude.

Only a beginning has been made in this study to develop the idea of orienting clue structure in the interpretive process of curriculum work. The challenge is to describe the idea of orienting clue structure in such a way so as not to slide back into an instrumentalist formulation of a positivistic "tool" for content analysis, interaction analysis, or other more systems oriented notions. Inquiry into problems of curriculum interpretation should remain responsive to the tacit, unspecifiable, personal, and transcendental character of knowledge as being.

In sum then it should be clear that the approach of this study involves a variety of processes such as conceptualization (of the idea of clue structure), interpretation (of theories of moral growth and their translation into clue structures), critical analysis (of children's books at the hand of the previously derived clue structures), theorizing (of what the reading experience is like), interviewing (of children), and phenomenological description (tentatively of one child's account of the reading experience).

Significance of the Study

Although this study is primarily exploratory and interpretive in nature, some practical suggestions for teachers are likely to present themselves. The analytic device of a clue structure may serve to help teachers in selecting and interpreting books that contain a moral growth component. This tool may encourage teachers to step beyond a thematic approach in designing their children's literature programs. Helping students to live through cathartic emotions of deep senses of community, fellowship, tolerance, and love through the vicarious experience of literature could make for better "pedagogical sense" in teachers. It may be that a competent pedagogy on the part of teachers and other educators is not primarily a function of their instrumental access to skills, techniques, and other such behavioral competencies. Rather, one might speculate that in the realm of moral growth, something more fundamental, or deeper grounded pedagogic sense, wisdom is required. This study is an attempt to encourage teachers to think about teaching learning, classrooms, and schools in a less positivistic, less technical manner.

Chapter II

THEORIES OF MORAL GROWTH

The four selected theories of moral growth are: (1) the values clarification approach, (2) the rational approach, (3) the cognitive developmental approach, and (4) the moral emotional approach. These approaches were chosen because, to some extent, they have already been experimented with in the classroom setting (Raths, Harmin and Simon, 1966; Scriven, 1977; Kohlberg, 1975; Beck, 1971; Sullivan, 1975; McPhail, 1973). Their differences in orientation and scope are broad enough to analyze the language of most books that contain a moral growth component.

The Values Clarification Approach

Raths, Harmin and Simon (1966) have devised a conceptual framework for guiding learning experiences toward the clarification of personal values. Their values clarification theory was developed on the premise that young children and adolescents in contemporary society suffer from values confusion. Young people have difficulty relating to the world in which they live. They must cope not only with the psychosomatic changes inherent in the process of maturation and development; they also must deal with the complexity of events of the world around them. Raths, Harmin and Simon argue that children who are confused and unclear about their own values, consequently

tend to behave pathologically or disorderly. They have developed a theory of values which aims at assisting children better to relate to society. They see people positioned and clustered at various points along a continuum which represent increasing degrees of clarity which individuals possess about their relationship to society. The teaching objective is to move students along the continuum from unclear to clear (see Figure 1).

Raths' approach is relativistic, experiential, and individualistic in nature. Values are chosen from personal experience: they are examined in a subjective manner, and no distinction is made between moral and other values. The question, "does the value help the individual to relate to his world in a satisfying and intelligent way?" (1966, p. 28) is the criterion which specifies the meaning of the concept of value. Moral judgments are not put to a public test nor to the test of some universal ethic; the child only is seen to be responsible for his or her value commitments.

The process through which values are clarified is composed of three kinds of behaviors: choosing, prizing, and acting. According to Raths, values play a role in the learning process in the sense that values are (1) chosen freely by the child, (2) chosen from alternatives, (3) chosen after thoughtful consideration of the possible consequences of each alternative, (4) personally prized and cherished, (5) openly affirmed, (6) acted upon, and (7) repeated over time. The role of the educator then, is to teach his students how to make value decisions through a sequence of valuing processes. Raths' values clarification model is pedagogically a positive theory to the extent that it




Figure 1

Teaching for Values Clarification

encourages the student to become clear and reflective about his or her own feelings, preferences, attitudes, and values.

The Rational Approach

The main feature of the rational approach to education is that it focuses on the logical, evidential, and semantic aspects of moral reasoning. Michael Scriven (1977) who can be seen as a proponent of this theory has argued that most reasoning about moral issues can be reduced to disagreements about facts, meaning interpretations, sources of evidence, and other logical moves. Very seldom do people actually disagree on the nature of the ultimate life values or ethical principles of moral thought. The point of the rational approach to moral thinking is not that it dismisses entirely the role of instrumental and ultimate life values. The pedagogical significance of the rational approach is that it provides for growth in the rational, rather than the emotional context within which moral issues usually arise. The objective is to increase the child's rational faculties: the ability to reason logically, to detect fallacies in reasoning, to be able to locate and appraise relevant evidence, and the ability to clarify semantic confusion and underlying assumptions.

For example, in coming to grips with the moral issue of racial discrimination, the rational approach attempts to further a child's understanding of the historical antecedents and the socio-psychological as well as the politico-economic forces which have given rise to problems of racism. The rational approach would help a child to detect instances of false consciousness and ideological grounds of

the reasons given and the explanations provided for racist behavior in society. The rational approach accepts declarations such as the Bill of Rights, constitutional statements, and the law of the land as the justifying grounds for the values and ethical principles involved in resolving a moral issue. In the school curriculum examples of this approach can be found in the humanities and the social studies, as well as in the science curricula dealing with ecological and technological problems and issues of our society.

The Cognitive Developmental Approach

The distinguishing features of Kohlberg's theory of moral growth are threefold: (1) it describes cognitive processes; (2) it is a developmental theory; and (3) it focuses on the formal rather than the content aspects of moral reasoning. Piaget and Dewey had noted already that moral growth in children moves from a preconventional (premoral) stage, through a conventional stage (when the moral codes and norms of the social group are internalized), to a postconventional or autonomous stage (where the individual subjects moral rules and decisions to critical judgement). Kohlberg (1975) refined and empirically corroborated Dewey's three developmental levels by observing how each level of moral reasoning may be further divided into two stages (see Figure 2). On the basis of his research findings Kohlberg claims that moral development through the six stages is sequential, irreversible, and the same for members of different cultures. Every individual functions predominantly (more than 50%) at one stage level. He has found further that the majority of adolescents and




Figure 2

Progression in Stages of Moral Reasoning

adults do not move beyond stage four, the law and order stage. Only 10% of the adult population seems to function on the principled level of stages five and six.

Yet, Kohlberg's model is educationally an optimistic theory. Assuming that, in a democratic society, it is desirable to strive for a high stage level of moral reasoning development, Kohlberg has described the psychological mechanisms of stage progression which would permit for a positive pedagogical program. Youngsters are confronted with moral dilemma situations wherein they are invited to make a best choice for acting. In the process of justifying and supporting these decisions the individual is systematically challenged by a form of reasoning which lies a stage above his or her own. Kohlberg argues that this process of justification and confrontation to a next stage higher leads to cognitive dissonance and the desire by the youngster to adopt this recognizably superior level of reasoning. In other words, a child who functions in a stage three orientation experiences doubt, dissonance, or uncertainty when the usual actions are no longer adequate to resolve a moral dilemma. An increased exposure and sensitivity toward stage four type reasoning accompanied by cognitive growth facilitates the child moving up into the next stage (see Figure 3).

The Moral Emotional Approach

A fourth approach in moral and values education, which has been used in the school curriculum, is the orientation developed by the British educator, Peter McPhail (1973). His approach differs from the




Figure 3

Kohlberg's Match +1 Concept

previous ones in that it is more explicitly directed at helping students experience positive moral values and emotions such as fellow-feeling and love. So, in contrast to the cognitive developmental and the rational theories this approach focuses on the emotional empathic faculties. The essential feature of this approach might best be explained by putting it in the context of Kohlberg's dilemmas.

Suppose a person who saves someone from a burning car is asked, "Why did you do it?" "How did you find it possible to risk your own life in pulling this person from a car that was at the point of exploding?" The person might respond with a reason which could be an expression of any one of Kohlberg's six stages of moral reasoning. But what do we make of it when this person answers, "I pulled the man from the car because, when I looked at his face, the way he looked at me . . . I just felt I had to. I guess I didn't really think about it. I was so much involved, engaged in the situation of that man's suffering in the car. I didn't think, I just did." Kohlberg has been criticized that responses such as the one just given do not seem to have a place in his cognitive schema. Some experiences do not seem to fit in a rational cognitive framework. In fact, Kohlberg (1971, 1973) himself has made attempts to deal with responses which seem to be of an emotional or empathic order. He has suggested the existence of a separate unrelated stage (stage seven) which should deal with responses that his theory of moral development cannot handle.

One is reminded of the existential philosophies of men such as Heidegger (1977) and Scheler (1954) who seem to have articulated forms of cognition or thinking which are associated more with feeling. Max

Scheler in his book The Nature of Sympathy says:

There is a mode of perception whose objects are totally beyond the grasp of the intellect, and for which the intellect is as blind as the ear and the sense of hearing are for colour—a mode of perception none-the-less, which presents to us real objects (echte objective Gegenstände) and an eternal order among them—namely the values and their hierarchy. (1954, p. xv)

Scheler (1954) makes a special effort to clarify phenomenologically the nature of empathy, fellow-feeling, and sympathy. Moral growth in an emotional moral sense would refer to an increasing capacity for such great humanizing values such as brotherhood, community, fellowship, and love. The process of gaining a fundamental community experience or tragedy experience was referred to by Aristotle in his Poetics as uplifting spiritual catharsis. Catharsis is the deep and edifying experience with which a Greek tragedy used to finish and which was meant to convert excess emotions into virtuous dispositions. Not only through real life experiences, but also through vicarious experiences gained through art forms such as literature, can we acquire cathartic emotions of deep senses of community and fellowship. It may well be a peculiar feature of this form of emotional growth that such cathartic experiences are most difficult to reduce to a verbal explanation.

Some Pedagogical Considerations of Content and Process in Moral Growth Theories

One approach in values and moral education that has been criticized in recent decades is the so-called "bag of virtues" orientation. What this implies is that traditional values, such as honesty, loyalty, respect for private property, justice, and so on are now

considered to be ideological; that is, it is argued that these selected or traditional values are values that belong to particular social classes or interest groups in society, or to particular societies or cultures. In this light it is not surprising that the Kohlberg theory of moral development has acquired such a large following. His theory claims to be value-free, in terms of the content of our moral commitments. Instead, the focus is on the formal or process oriented aspects of moral thinking. It is true that the main parts of Kohlberg's theory focus on process but the exception probably is Stage six, which is the most fascinating element of his theory. It is at this stage level that Kohlberg argues that the striving for an integrated and principled philosophy based on the ultimate life value of justice determines the highest stage of moral thinking. It is precisely here though that moral content (i.e., justice) seems to invade moral process. This means that on the highest developmental level of moral reasoning, issues and dilemmas are to be resolved by way of reference to a life philosophy wherein justice and other critical moral categories such as freedom, equality, and community play a critical role. This same kind of critique can be leveled against other theories of values education and moral education.

For example, Raths' values clarification approach also claims to have rid itself from traditional elements of indoctrination and moralizing didactics. Instead, it offers an approach whereby children choose, prize, and commit themselves to values in an exercise of free choice. It is questionable, however, whether a "supermarket"

approach to values commitment is realistic in a society (or any society) where children come to school with an already enculturated system of values, feelings, and dispositions.

The rational approach to values education also claims to go beyond indoctrination and nineteenth century moralizing. This approach does not take a developmental orientation, but instead focuses on the grounds upon which value issues are decided. In particular, the rational approach to values teaching attempts to help the child sort out the normative, jurisprudential, from the factual, empirical elements of reasoning. In addition, attention is paid to clarify semantic confusions and linguistic issues in the full understanding of arguments about moral issues. Ultimately, the rational approach must be rooted in an "acceptable" value framework in order to be able to find consensus. And, as was mentioned before, such framework has been found in the Bill of Rights, constitutional statements, the law of the land, or a favored philosophic position such as pragmatism, or utilitarianism. Thus, the value base of the rational theory is relative to the societal framework within which it operates.

The shortcomings of all these theories are that they do not recognize that they too, are an expression of a particular ideology. This ideology prioritizes the value of individual choice and it offers a relativistic ethic which premises that objectivity is antithetical to the idea of values and ultimately value commitments should be a matter of personal choice from alternatives. The snag in this premise is that the content dimension of moral thinking cannot be separated completely from the process dimension. This is true for the cognitive

developmental theory, for the values clarification theory, as well as for the rational theory of values education and moral education.

The moral emotional approach appears to be least guilty of trying to avoid the accusation of indoctrination by focusing away from the content dimension or by adopting a relativistic stance in moral education. The moral emotional approach recognizes that people are capable of both extreme selfish and altruistic behavior, and also extreme egotistic and empathic behavior. Most people, of course, regard altruistic and empathic behavior as more positive than selfish and egotistic behavior (even though in our culture selfish and egotistic behavior are materially rewarded in competitive social situations). The affective ability to master empathy has been observed by Murphy (1937) in children upward from nursery school age. Since Murphy, numerous studies of empathic behavior have been done (Hoffman, 1976, p. 126). Empathy may be defined as the involuntary, sometimes forceful, experiencing of another person's emotional state, as well as the person's perceptions, thoughts, and wishes. In her classical study Murphy has concluded that empathy is a natural response to the experience of witnessing another person experience distress.

As Hoffman (1976) reviews the theories of empathic development in children, he notes that through the developmental behaviors of role taking and strengthening of ego-identity, empathic distress becomes transformed into sympathetic distress. In turn, altruistic motives such as cooperation and charity develop out of the synthesis of empathic distress and the child's increasingly sophisticated sense

of the other. In other words, the capacity for empathy has direct consequences for the more mature capacity for fellowship, cooperation, and love. Since the original experiences of distress in others trigger off the child's empathic responses Hoffman (1976) suggests that:

Sensitivity to the needs and feelings of others may be fostered by allowing the child to have the normal run of distress experiences, rather than shielding him from them, so as to provide a broad base for empathic and sympathetic stress in early years. (p. 142)

It would appear that, whereas each educational theory of moral growth in the context of children's literature has its weaknesses and limitations, each approach focuses on worthwhile content and/or process dimensions of moral learning. A comparison of the four basic approaches in moral and values education follows in Figure 4. The figure "Comparison of Four Basic Approaches in Moral and Values Education" shows the four approaches to moral growth from left to right at the top of the chart. As the figure is read downward the main proponents of the four approaches to moral growth in education are listed. Each approach is identified with a basic model of the disciplines of psychology, philosophy, or law. Next, the individuals are mentioned who have established a theoretical basis for the models. For example, Maslow and Rogers are known for having developed a theoretic basis for therapeutic work in counselling. Each moral growth orientation can be seen to foster its own educational aims, and to serve its own vision of educational needs. The term "medium" is meant to bring out the pedagogic strategies which the teacher is supposed to use in promoting moral growth in the different orientations. Finally, the learning outcomes associated with the various moral growth orientations are listed.

| | VALUES CLARIFICATION | MORAL REASONING | MORAL EMOTIONAL GROWTH | RATIONAL MORAL THEORY |
|-------------------------------|--|---|---|---|
| Chief Educational Proponents: | Raths and Simon | Kohlberg | Peter McPhail | Scriven, Oliver, Newmann |
| Basic Model: | Therapeutic | Developmental | Moral-existential | Juris-prudential |
| Theoretical Basis: | Self-actualizing or humanistic psychology e.g., Maslow, Rogers | Deweyan philosophy and stages of moral development | Fellowship philosophy of Martin Buber, phenomenology of Max Scheler | Rational philosophy of Aristotle |
| Aim: | Increase student's awareness of value relationship to society | Facilitate natural development of moral reasoning powers | Increase the great humanizing values of love, fellowship, community | Increase rational competencies: Logical reasoning, proof process, semantic analysis |
| Need: | Serves the frustrated student and society | Serves the "unfolding" individual | Serves the need for genuine community and communitarian social change | Serves the enlightenment ideal of the "rational man and woman" |
| Medium: | Elicited personal life experiences of students | Open-ended moral dilemmas | Opportunities for deep empathic involvement in moral values/feelings | Moral issues and public controversy |
| Outcomes: | Feelings of positive self-worth, more tolerant and accepting of others, knowing where one stands | Slow progression upward the stages of moral reasoning abilities | Capable of generating deep emotions of love, fellowship, etc. | Ability to address moral issues in a rational manner |

Figure 4

Comparison of Four Basic Approaches in Moral and Values Education

Chapter III

DEVELOPMENT OF THE IDEA OF CLUE STRUCTURE

Knowledge as Clues

For the purpose of this study, I will initiate and utilize the idea of "orienting clue structure" as an analytic device and relate it to Polanyi's discussion of the idea of clues. The idea of clue structure can be used by the educator as a hermeneutic device to interpret and analyze classroom situations and curriculum materials. Much of what teachers do in the classroom—listening to concerns of students, settling arguments, planning experiences, showing, explaining, praising, and reflecting—belongs in the domain of the tacit, the kind of knowledge we are aware of only subsidiarily and which can be recaptured in a fashion only phenomenologically, i.e., retrospectively and reflectively. The idea of tacit knowledge assumes that what goes into making a particular teaching program, strategy or a lesson successful is not reducible to explicit behavioral objectives. If Polanyi (1958) is correct then much of our knowledge is concerned with feeling our way forward, groping for what seems to elude our consciousness. And yet we have a sense of orientation and confidence of doing things. As Polanyi says, we know more than we can tell. Intuitively this seems to strike a responsive cord with many language arts teachers. We often may suggest a certain book to a child because we sense that it may engage the child in a

pedagogically consequential way. And yet we may have a hard time putting our hunches into clear words. Curriculum interpretation is however, a necessary matter in the process of teaching children. The use of clue structures in the analysis of curriculum resources may guide us then as teachers in gaining a sense of what is an appropriate reading experience for certain children. The point is that knowledge that we hold subsidiarily, and which may be traced by way of clues, may guide us in appropriately handling situations that arise in the classroom. Clues are tacit instruments of our attention; we are intensely aware of them while we focus on the object of our attention.

The distinction between subsidiary and focal awareness becomes clearer when we look at Polanyi's notion of "clues": those threads which serve as guides, or suggest a line of inquiry. We are subsidiarily aware of something as a clue or an instrument pointing beyond itself. In the focal sense, we do not know what we are looking for yet we can look for it because we can rely on clues to its nature, clues through which we somehow anticipate what we have not yet plainly understood. The knower, then relies on a variety of clues, grasped only subsidiarily, in order to attend to the focal object of his knowing. Clues, moreover, are aspects of ourselves—who we are in our very being. They are oriented points in our own attitudes, skills, memories, hunches. Existentially speaking, clues are aspects of our transcendence. Clues are orienting features of the interpretive process, as such and are not observed in themselves. "They are made to function as extensions of our bodily equipment and this involves a

certain change of our own being" (Polanyi, 1958, vii).

Clue Structures

Curriculum interpretation of children's actual or potential learning through the use of clue structures is an attempt to apprehend the phenomenological significance of a cognitive experience in a child's life. Moreover, clue structure is a conception which helps point at the hermeneutic meanings of certain intentional experiences in a child's growing up process. Ordinary content analysis strives for inter-judge reliability (objectivity) by compromising itself to quantitative methods; such as the counting of significant terms or determining the frequency of occurrence of specifiable conceptual phrases. One problem with content analysis is that one text may be judged more racially biased than another text on the grounds of the frequency of racially charged words, references or pictures. What it tends to gloss, however, is the fact that on a deeper structural level, or in terms of its form (grammar) a text may be more viciously biased than another even though the bias is concealed by a greater absence of biased references or language. Hence, to clarify the deep structure, and existential meanings of selected children's books, and to be able to assess whether any particular book reflects a philosophy that is in line with a moral growth or a value theory a clue structure will be developed.

The idea of clue structure may be used by the educator as a hermeneutic device to interpret and analyze classroom situations and curriculum materials. For the purpose of this study, clue structures

will be conceptualized and rationalized to function as analytic devices which can be used to interpret or analyze a literary text for the way in which it provides for opportunities of moral growth experiences. Interpretation and evaluation of a particular book by means of a clue structure is not fundamentally different from the process of literary criticism. It should be possible to determine whether a particular book is best suited to provide for certain kinds of experience. For example, a book which might have an underlying Kohlbergian philosophy would involve the main character in a series of situations which resemble choices or decisions for acting analogous to Kohlberg's dilemmas. The implication is that books which can be interpreted at the hand of different clue structures would require different sensibilities and different kinds of responsiveness on the part of the reader. For the teacher, a clue structure may help to orient and identify what issues and concerns should be dealt with in questions and discussion. One section of this study is concerned with the analysis and application of the specially devised clue structures to four selected books. The moral emotional approach will be refined and an attempt to explore the relationship between this approach to moral growth and fairy tales will be explored. A further exploration of the nature of a particular reading experience will take the form of an analysis of a group discussion following the oral reading of a fairy tale. To obtain more clues for interpreting the significance of a selected fairy tale for moral growth experiences the language of a single child, after he has read the story to himself, will be studied.

Clue Structure—Values Clarification

In order to fit into the values clarification mode, a book would need to meet the following analytic criteria:

1. Ego change : The main character of the book is a young person who is in the process of change (change of ego identity, personal values, life philosophy, etc.).
2. Unclear to clear: : This change is typically from a confused ambiguous state toward a more clear, purposive state.
3. Experiential growth : The young reader of the book should be invited to live through the changes.
4. Age relevance : The changes and ego identity crises, etc. should be typical and relevant to the age of the reader.

Clue Structure—Rational

In attending to the clue structure of the rational approach to moral and value education, we should examine whether a text provides for opportunity of growth in the direction of logical reasoning, social science knowledge, and analysis of language skills. In order to fit into the rational approach to moral growth, a book would need to satisfy the following analytic criteria:

1. Moral issue: : The theme of the book deals with a relevant socio-psychological moral issue.
2. Fact-fiction integration : The book presents to the reader a fictionalized factual body of historical and sociological data relevant to the issue. (Alex Haley, the author of Roots, coined the word "factional" to refer to this fact-fiction integration.)
3. Critical moves : The book contains thought sequences which directly or indirectly lead to the phenomena of "seeing through," uncovering assumptions, fallacies, etc.

4. Value objectivity : Implicit is an "acceptable" value position, which usually reflects our present societal frameworks of human rights, constitutional statements, etc.

Clue Structure—Moral Developmental

In order to fit into the moral developmental mode, a book would need to meet the following analytic criteria:

1. Moral dilemma : The main character of a book is a (young) person who confronts a situation which forces him or her to make a difficult decision—a moral dilemma.
2. Moral judgment structure : A variety of reasons and justifications, at various stage levels of moral development are presented to support alternative decisions for acting.
3. Stage progression : The reader is led to the recognition that certain reasons and justifications are superior or more adequate than others.

Clue Structure—Moral Emotional

In order to meet the experiential emotional mode, a book would need to satisfy the following analytic criteria:

1. Emotional convincibility : The vividness and stylistic subtlety in which feelings and emotions are expressed is convincing in an experiential psychological sense.
2. Phenomenological essence : Moral emotional values such as "love," "sacrifice," or "fellowship" are clarified analytically, relevant to existential or phenomenological inquiry.
3. Catharsis : The reader is invited to experience empathically and vicariously the "uplifting" or "humanizing" force of an ultimate life value such as love.

Concluding this chapter, it should be made clear that the above schemas are not themselves clue structures as elaborated on the basis of Polanyi's philosophy. Rather, the above schemas are summary statements of clue structures which function on both levels of subsidiary and focal awareness. The schemas are simplifications, since they reflect focal rather than tacit knowledge teachers may hold regarding the provision of children's books to provide for moral growth. In the next chapter the clue structures, represented by the schemas, will be applied to the analysis of four selected children's books. However, since such analyses are mostly abstractions from the concrete nature of the reading experience, subsequent chapters will attempt to move beyond the clue structure schemas to a more phenomenological level in order to gain access to the tacit (partly inexplicable dimensions) of the reading experience.

Chapter IV

USING CLUE STRUCTURES BY WAY OF ANALYZING CHILDREN'S BOOKS

The purpose of this chapter is to demonstrate the possible use of the four clue structures as summarized in the previous sections. Four books were selected to illustrate such analyses: (1) Judy Blume's Are You There God? It's Me Margaret is examined for its value clarifying emphasis, (2) Paula Fox's The Slave Dancer is shown to reveal a rational moral emphasis, (3) Betsy Byars' The Midnight Fox is shown to contain a cognitive developmental emphasis, and (4) Oscar Wilde's The Happy Prince is examined for its moral emotional emphasis.

It speaks for itself that none of these books fit the presented clue structures in an exclusive manner. The analysis can only show an emphasis and consequently this occurs to some extent at the expense of seeing other possible dimensions of moral growth that a book might provide. For example, all four books can be argued to possess moral emotional value since they all may touch, in an existential sense, the young reader's personal feelings.

The selection of the books is necessarily somewhat subjective. Other books could have been chosen. However, selection was not completely arbitrary. The four books were selected because they are considered to be popular, widely read, and probably "good" literature. In my experience these books are appropriate for a similar age (grade) level (upper elementary school). Each book was selected (intuitively one might say) on the basis of a tacit sense of the clue

structures which constitute this author's understanding of the different theories of moral growth. Furthermore, each book would seem to be strongly representative of at least one conceptual schema of moral growth.

The analytic procedures are as follows:

1. A brief overview of the story is sketched.
2. At the hand of illustrative quotes the stories are analyzed for the way in which they meet the analytic criteria of the clue structures.
3. Some pedagogical considerations are articulated.

The Values Clarifying Emphasis: Are You There God?
It's Me Margaret by Judy Blume

Sketch of the Story

Judy Blume in her book Are You There God? It's Me Margaret openly deals with a young girls' adolescent preoccupation with breast development and menstruation. Margaret Simon is the only child of a mixed marriage and has just moved from apartment living in New York to the suburbs in Farbrook, New Jersey. This sets the stage for making new friends, attending a new school, and exploring religious alternatives. Margaret's sexual experiences and identity crises come across most convincingly as she struggles with her moral and physical developments. An interfering grandmother, a perceptive and sensitive mother, a non-practicing Jew for a father, and a best friend who is leader of the "secret club," are all refreshing characters. The author is obviously in sympathy with the moods and concerns of the

young adolescent, whom she treats with humour, authenticity, and disarming frankness.

Clue Structure Analysis

Of the four conceptual schemas for moral growth, Rath's values clarification theory seems best suited for analyzing this book. The main character from page one to the conclusion of the book, is involved in a process of change. She doesn't know quite where she fits among her peers or in society at large.

"Are you there God? It's me Margaret. I just told my mother I want a bra. Please help me grow God. You know where. I want to be like everyone else. You know God, my new friends all belong to the Y or the Jewish Community Center. Which way am I supposed to go? I don't know what you want me to do about that." (1970, p. 37)

Clearly, the criterion of ego change can be applied to this story. Sexual development brings with it confusion and uncertainty and makes demands on the value system of the adolescent. The young reader soon becomes aware that selecting a religious affiliation creates ambiguity and ambivalence for Margaret. For her individual school project, Margaret decides to attend church services of various sects to determine her religious denomination. The reader observes that she moves from an unclear to a fairly clear and positive state.

"I have not really enjoyed my religious experiments very much and I don't think I'll make up my mind one way or the other for a long time. I don't think a person can decide to be a certain religion just like that. It's like having to choose your own name. You think about it a long time and then you keep changing your mind. If I should ever have children I will tell them what religion they are so they can start learning about it at an early age. Twelve is very late to learn." (1970, p. 143)

Margaret's thoughts on religion have been clarified through a number of experiences that are presented to the reader throughout the book. Since the story is written in the first person, the reader is encouraged to identify with the problems and conflicts that Margaret undergoes in her growth towards maturity.

"I've been looking for you God. I looked in the temple. I looked in church. And today, I looked for you when I wanted to confess. But you weren't there. I didn't feel you at all." (1970, p. 120)

Pedagogical Considerations

How is this book helpful pedagogically in terms of its values clarification emphasis? First, if a particular student undertakes to read the book alone without teacher guidance or questioning (which may be likely since its content borders on the controversy of sex education) the book would seem to be relevant only to the extent that the reader is or has experienced similar confusion and ambiguity about sexual or religious matters. Therefore, age relevance is an important factor to consider. However, if the teacher decides to use the book with a particular class or group of students to promote the clarification of implicit values, she might consider asking such questions as: "Why is Margaret so concerned with developing physically?" "Why do she and her friends form a secret club?" "Why is it important for Margaret not to be the last one to get her period?" "Why does she want a bra?" "Why does Margaret want to know whether to join the Y or the Jewish community league?" "Why does it seem important to have a religion?" Students might be encouraged to write poetry or prose on similar topics of relevance to adolescents.

The Rational Emphasis: The Slave Dancer
by Paula Fox

Sketch of the Story

Paula Fox's historical novel The Slave Dancer focuses on a boy's maturation in the context of the illegal venture of procuring slaves for profit in 1840. Jessie Bollier, a thirteen-year-old boy is kidnapped to serve as piper aboard a slave ship bound for the Bight of Benin along the African coastline. He broadens his knowledge of people while he performs duties of running errands, mending sails, and tracking rats, but when Jessie is called upon to "dance the slaves," he cannot accept his role and the inhumane practices of the times. An historically plausible picture emerges: of selective law enforcements of governments, profit motives, exploitation, and the transport practices and marketing of slaves. Solid characterizations of the crew—Purvis, Grime, and Stout—and the African boy Ras provide opportunities to view situations and events from alternative perspectives. Although the plot is crowded with excitement, danger, and action, it is forceful enough to stimulate the reader to reflect on the influence and implications the story has for the present.

Clue Structure Analysis

Of the four conceptual schemas for moral development, the rational approach to moral and values education seems best suited to the task of analyzing this book. The underlying theme of man's inhumanity to man is clarified through the moral issue of slavery and its relationship to racism.

"Why must the slaves dance?" I asked timidly, for fear of annoying Smith.

. . . "Because it makes them healthy," said Smith. "It's hard to make a profit out of a sick nigger—the insurance ain't so easy to collect. And it makes any Captain wild to jettison the sick ones within sight of the marketplace itself after all the trouble he's gone to." (1973, pp. 65-66)

Historical fact is integrated successfully with fiction. The young reader soon accumulates a wealth of historical and sociological data useful to detect fallacies and to uncover faulty reasoning and assumptions.

"It's not drink," I protested. "It's the kidnapping that turns everyone round!"

. . . "Don't say such things!" he bellowed. "You know nothing about it! Do you think it was easier for my own people who sailed to Boston sixty years ago from Ireland, locked up in a hold for the whole voyage where they might have died of sickness and suffocation? Do you know my father was haunted all his days by the memory of those who died before his eyes in that ship, and were flung into the sea? And you dare speak of my parents in the same breath with these niggers!"

"I know nothing about your father and mother," I said in a voice that trembled. "Besides, they were not sold on the block."

"The Irish were sold!" he cried. "Indeed, they were sold!"

"They are not sold now," I muttered. But he raved on, and I sank to the desk, covering my ears with my hands. How could he object to one thing and not another? It made no sense at all!"

Through Jessie's experience on the slave ship, the reader learns how the slave trade came about, how it was done, and how racist feelings might develop.

The slaves were all looking at the place where the woman had been thrown overboard. Sick and stooped, half-starved by now, and soiled from the rarely cleaned holds, they stared hopelessly at the empty horizon.

I found a dreadful thing in my mind.

I hated the slaves! I hated their shuffling, their howling their very suffering! I hated the way they spat out their food upon the deck, the overflowing buckets, the emptying of which tried all my strength. I hated the foul stench that came from the holds no matter which way the wind blew, as though the ship itself were soaked with human excrement.

I would have snatched the rope from Spark's hand and beaten them myself! Oh God! I wished them all dead! Not to hear them! Not to smell them! Not to know of their existence! (1973, pp. 91-92)

The criterion of critical moves becomes quite apparent in the book when the reader notes various verbal exchanges between Jessie and other members of the crew and his ensuing reflections on these matters. Through Jessie's descriptions and comments, the reader is led to the phenomenon of "seeking through" a situation.

Except for Ned, who held all living men in low esteem, I saw the others regarded the slaves as less than animals, although having a greater value in gold. But except for Stout and Spark and the Captain, the men were not especially cruel save in their shared and unshakable conviction that the least of them was better than any black alive. Gardere and Purvis and Cooley even played with the small black children who now roamed the deck with relative freedom, the sailors allowing themselves to be chased about if the Captain and Spark were not watching, giving the children extra water from their own slim rations and fashioning rough toys of wood to amuse them. (1973, p. 95)

Lastly, throughout the book, there is an implicit value position, namely that slavery and racist behavior is detestable, not in keeping with a modern sense of human rights. The reader recognizes in Jessie's conversation with another crew member that despite the negative and racist description of the slaves, that their inhumane treatment is immoral.

"The Captain! He cares nothing for what's done to them as long as they can still draw breath. And he doesn't know about Stout and the nigger woman. Why, I believe he'd have the dead ones stuffed if he thought he could sell them so! And when he loses a few, he still has the insurance. He can always say he jettisoned the sick ones to save the healthy. And he'll collect! He always has! And if they're all sickly when we get where we're going, there's many a trick for hiding their condition. Anyhow, the planters will buy them no matter what, for if they drop dead in the fields, there's an endless supply of them." (1973, p. 96)

Pedagogical Considerations

How helpful is the application of the rational approach to children's literature in the classroom setting? It might be argued that the approach provides the teacher with a practical framework that can be employed to promote higher moral reasoning in the student. First, the teacher would devise a number of questions to help the students reveal the moral stance that underlies the historical and sociological content of the book. Moreover, for the teacher of social studies or language arts, the application of the rational approach is very useful in terms of the focus on critical reasoning skills, such as interpretation, stating moral issues clearly, appraising evidence, logical reasoning, etc. To develop the skill of interpretation, the teacher might take passages from the book and ask the students to discriminate between true and false assumptions, or instruct them to compare the ideas and points of view of different story characters. To develop the skills of evaluation and application, quotations from the book could be provided that would encourage the students to draw inferences, make judgments, express opinions, predict outcomes, solve problems interpret emotions, recognize concepts, and apply them to real-life situations.

The Cognitive Developmental Emphasis: The Midnight Fox by Betsy Byars

The Midnight Fox is a story of a ten-year-old boy's stay at his uncle's farm while his parents are touring Europe. Tommy is sensitively portrayed by the writer; he doesn't like staying on the farm and is alone much of the time, daydreaming and fantasizing about

the world of the woods around him. Things take a sudden turn when one day he sights a black fox. Upon first encountering the animal, Tommy experiences an awesome feeling that his whole life is going to change. When the discovery is made that the fox has been killing the farm poultry, Tommy learns that his uncle, a man who is happiest when he is hunting with a gun, plans to destroy the creature which he, Tommy, has come to love and respect. Tommy thinks of all the possible alternatives that might convince his uncle to change his mind, but he realizes that none will stop the killing. Sickened both emotionally and physically, he accompanies his uncle on the hunt and tries to lead him away from the fox's den. But the den is found, the pup is dug out, and is caged as bait to attract the mother. What should Tommy do? Try to save the fox, but disobey his uncle? Despite Tommy's real fear of heights, he climbs from his bedroom window down a huge tree while everyone is asleep. He breaks open the cage and sets the pup free. At the risk of angering his uncle, and disappointing his parents, he does what he feels he must do.

Clue Structure Analysis

Upon comparing the four conceptual schemas for moral growth, Kohlberg's moral developmental theory seems most suited to analyze The Midnight Fox. A moral dilemma is presented very early in the book and sustains the story line to the very end. What is the nature of Tommy's dilemma? The young reader of the book soon realizes that Tommy is "in a bind." On the one hand, he has developed a deep attachment and respect for the black fox. However, this friendship is clearly illegitimate since the fox is harmful to his uncle's

property. The dilemma seems to be that Tommy has to side either with the fox or with his uncle. The dilemma is anchored in the story by a number of developments. What was the difficult decision Tommy faced in the story? Why was this decision difficult? What would be the consequences for Tommy of saving the fox or helping his uncle? (These are questions a teacher might want to use in debriefing the book.) On the surface, it would seem that Tommy's dilemma is not a difficult one. Going along with his uncle's plan to kill the fox not only would have been the easy way out, but also it would have provided an opportunity for Tommy to earn his uncle's approval and admiration. After all, Tommy could have shown his uncle the fox's den since he knew the hiding place. Clearly this should have been the easiest decision for Tommy to make. Why was it not an easy decision? There seems to be something higher at stake here. What was Tommy to gain by saving the fox? (This is what a teacher might want to ask students to think about and perhaps to write an explanation of Tommy's decision.)

The young reader of the book who identifies with Tommy's dilemma soon learns that there are all kinds of reasons for Tommy to act either this way or that way. These reasons are in a sense judgmental structures or justifications for acting and they can be analyzed in terms of Kohlberg's stage levels. For example, there is Tommy's aunt. What is her view of the matter? She clearly wants the fox to be "done away with."

"I'm not going to put up with it," she continued. "I mean it, Fred. Once a fox gets started, he'll clean out the whole henhouse. I have worked too hard on those hens to just stand by and watch some fox walk off with them one by one." (1968, p. 97)

It would seem that the aunt's response might be placed on Kohlberg's stage two level. Her justification would seem to fit the pattern of the instrumental-relativist orientation where decision making is based on what satisfies one's own needs.

Then there is Tommy's cousin Hazeline. Her view of the fox problem is interesting. She admonishes Tommy to accept things the way they are.

"Tommy, listen, all wild animals die in some violent way. It's their life. Wild animals just don't die of old age. They get killed by an enemy or by the weather or they have an accident or they get rabies or some other disease or they get shot. That's the way nature is." (1968, p. 131)

Cousin Hazeline's argument seems to rely on something like the "rules or laws of nature." This is Kohlberg's normative order maintenance (stage four), law and order orientation. Certain things just are this way; they must be accepted. Tommy seems to recognize the validity of his cousin's justification.

"I know that," I said quickly, because I did not want to hear any more. (1968, p. 131)

Yet it also seems that he cannot accept it altogether. Why should things be this way?

Tommy's uncle reacts to the news of the fox in a manner-of-course. When his wife informs him that a fox has killed her prize turkey, he routinely says, "I'll take care of it" (1968, p. 99). Yet there is an element of "for the sheer joy of killing" in his view of the matter.

"Tomorrow afternoon we'll go see," he said. "We'll take Happ and go into the woods." He clapped me on the back with his hand—it was the first time he had ever touched me—and I could see that he was excited about going after the fox! (1968, pp. 103-104)

It would seem that Uncle Fred's response might be placed on Kohlberg's stage three level, in the way that he obligingly promises his wife to take care of the fox. And there are elements of stage one in his behavior as well. Tracking down the fox and killing the fox are hedonistic consequences intrinsic to the act of hunting. Naturally, Tommy's involvement in the drama of the fox is more complex than any of the other characters in the book. Tommy has mixed feelings and motives which cause him much confusion and need for reflection. Tommy's reasons behind his decision seem to indicate concern for the dignity, freedom, and even the rights of a wild animal.

I heard the sound of the hound in the woods again, and I knew that the black fox was out there running beneath the trees. To me she was worth a hundred turkeys and hens. (1968, p. 112)

Here it is clear that Tommy has not quite universalized his respect for live creatures. He is willing to sacrifice a hundred turkeys for the fox.

I wished suddenly that I had lots of money and could go down to Aunt Millie and say, "Here! I want to buy every hen and turkey you have on behalf of the black fox. They are all to belong to her, and she may come and get them whenever she chooses." (1968, p. 112)

On the one hand, Tommy's reasoning seems to fit stage five or six of Kohlberg's schema. Tommy's self-chosen decision appeals to the stage five principled level and tentatively to the universal principle of justice and respect for the dignity of a wild creature. Yet there are other instances in the book where Tommy consistently acts a stage three, the "good boy" orientation. For example,

"Son, this trip means a lot to your mother. She has never had a real vacation in her whole life. Remember last summer

when we were all packed to go to the Smokies and you got the measles?"

"Yes."

"And she stayed home and nursed you and never complained once about it, did she?"

"Well, no." (1968, p. 16)

Here Tommy's father seems to attempt to persuade him in a "tit-for-tat" manner, typical of Kohlberg's reciprocity behavior or stage two.

"Now she has a chance for a real trip and I want her to have it. I want her to go to Europe and see everything she's wanted to see all her life. And I don't want her to be worried about you the whole time. As long as she thinks you don't want to go to the farm, she is going to worry."

"But I don't want to go."

My father sighed. "You don't have to let her know that. For once in your life you could think of someone besides yourself!"

Sometimes when my dad said something like that to me—well, I wouldn't actually cry or anything; my nose would just start to run. It did this all the time really. One time after school my teacher said, "Tom, I am very disappointed in you. You simply are not working up to capacity this term." Well, . . . I couldn't say anything because my nose started to run.

Now, I put my hand up to my nose and said, "All right, I want to go to the farm." Then I picked up my model and started pretending to work, because my eyes were kind of wet too. (1968, p. 17)

Tommy seems to be learning to think in terms of Kohlberg's stage three of the conventional level of moral development. He resigns himself to spending his vacation on the farm to make his mother happy. He exhibits the "good boy" behavior because it pleases his father. So Tommy earns approval by being "nice." At the same time, he learns to transcend the more naive-egotistical behavior of the pre-conventional level.

If we accept the story on face value, then it seems that Tommy who could be quite egotistical has grown very abruptly into a young person capable of moral reflections on a high principled level.

Tommy's experience with the fox indeed had a powerful impact on his young life. The major difficulty with this book may be that Tommy is portrayed by the author at once as being young and morally immature and yet, capable of sophisticated moral reflection. It is quite plausible that the ten or eleven-year-old student who reads the book may not fully understand Tommy's reasons for saving the black fox, except for the sentimental reasons, of course.

Pedagogical Considerations

To the extent that the moral developmental theory can function as a selection aid for the classroom teacher, it can be considered useful. But it is in the area of the provision of teaching strategies and learning outcomes that the theory is most effective and practical in the classroom. The kinds of questions a teacher can pose to students after they have read a selected book that fits the moral developmental clue structure become important when the general objective is to promote higher moral reasoning. Understanding Kohlberg's six stages and developing the skill of slotting story characters into appropriate stages permits the teacher to devise her questions in a more relevant and meaningful way. The discussions of moral dilemmas in children's literature provide a rich interaction which can help to facilitate the development of higher levels of moral reasoning.

The Moral Emotional Emphasis: The Happy Prince by Oscar Wilde

Sketch of the Story

Oscar Wilde's The Happy Prince is a fairy tale and differs from realistic fiction (into which the previously mentioned books fall) in terms of its fantasy dimension. The moral emotional theory of growth seems best suited to analyzing this book. Fantasy often expresses a truth or illuminates reality more forcefully than other genres because it possesses a quality that takes the reader beyond mere cognitive understanding, toward the heights of feeling and experiencing. The Happy Prince seems to be the kind of story that affects some readers in such a way that they say, "After reading this, I am not quite the same." A story containing a quality that evokes such a statement is recognizable to us in and through feeling. The German poet, Schiller once wrote, "Deeper meaning resides in the fairy tales told to me in my childhood than in the truth that is taught by life" (The Piccolomini, III, 4).

Clue Structure Analysis

This book meets the criterion of emotional convincibility. The young reader experiences the feelings of love and compassion that the prince shows toward the poor.

"When I was alive and had a human heart," answered the statue, "I did not know what tears were, for I lived in the Palace of Sans-Souci, where sorrow is not allowed to enter. In the daytime I played with my companions in the garden, and in the evening I led the dance in the Great Hall. Round the garden ran a very lofty wall, but I never cared to ask what lay beyond it, everything about me was so beautiful. My courtiers called me the Happy Prince, and happy indeed I was, if pleasure be happiness. So I lived, and so I died. And now

that I am dead they have set me up here so high that I can see all the ugliness and all the misery of my city, and though my heart is made of lead yet I cannot choose but weep." (1888, 1968, pp. 16-19)

At first thought, the idea of fantasy and fairy tales may trigger associations of illusions, falseness, and charlatanism. Common sense might suggest that there exists a marked contradiction between the idea of fantasy and convincing reality. But the vicarious experience of literary fantasy can be rendered convincing by means of the same psychological principles that lie at the root of any experienced reality. For example, William James (1950) has shown under what conditions experiences are believed to be true and real. Impressions gain a sense of reality, he says, when the manner in which they establish themselves in consciousness excites and stimulates us. Special qualities he discusses are coerciveness of attention; liveliness or sensible pungency; emotional interest, as object of feelings of love, dread, desire, admiration; congruency with other beliefs and feelings; and logical independence in terms of causal importance (James, 1950, II, pp. 290-291).

Most fairy tales seem to be characterized by some existential dilemma which is stated clearly and briefly. This allows the child to immediately meet the problem in its most essential form. In The Happy Prince, the statue is overcome by the misery and poverty of the people in the city. He enlists the help of a swallow to carry the jewels and gold that cover his body to the poor so they may feed and clothe themselves. The swallow is on its annual migration south; it must leave before winter comes. But the swallow chooses to stay with the prince through the cold winter. Instead of flying to safety in warm

Egypt, he sacrifices his life for the love of another. This book meets the criterion of phenomenological essence. The emotional values of "love" and "sacrifice" are analytically clarified through the text. The reader experiences empathically the power of the prince's love for humanity in this passage.

"In the square below," said the Happy Prince, "there stands a little match-girl. She has let her matches fall in the gutter, and they are all spoiled. Her father will beat her if she does not bring home some money, and she is crying. She has no shoes or stockings, and her little head is bare. Pluck out my other eye, and give it to her, and her father will not beat her."

"I will stay with you one night longer," said the Swallow, "but I cannot pluck out your eye. You would be quite blind then."

"Swallow, Swallow, little Swallow," said the Prince, "do as I command you."

So he plucked out the Prince's other eye, and darted down with it. He swooped past the match-girl, and slipped the jewel into the palm of her hand.

. . . Then the Swallow came back to the Prince. "You are blind now," he said, "so I will stay with you always."

"No, little Swallow," said the poor Prince, "you must go away to Egypt."

"I will stay with you always," said the Swallow, and he slept at the Prince's feet. (1888, 1968, pp. 40-41)

Oscar Wilde's touching description of the swallow's loving sacrifice amounts to a classic sense of catharsis.

The poor little Swallow grew colder and colder, but he would not leave the Prince, he loved him too well. He picked up crumbs outside the baker's door when the baker was not looking, and tried to keep himself warm by flapping his wings.

But at last he knew that he was going to die. He had just enough strength to fly up to the Prince's shoulder once more. "Good-bye dear Prince!" he murmured, "will you let me kiss your hand?"

"I am glad that you are going to Egypt at last, little Swallow," said the Prince, "you have stayed too long here; but you must kiss me on the lips, for I love you."

"It is not to Egypt that I am going," said the Swallow. "I am going to the House of Death. Death is the brother of Sleep, is he not?"

And he kissed the Happy Prince on the lips, and fell down dead at his feet. (1888, 1968, pp. 49-51)

Bettelheim (1976) claims in his book, The Uses of Enchantment that the child needs, "a moral education which subtly, and by implication only conveys to him the advantages of moral behavior, not through abstract ethical concepts but through that which seems tangibly right and therefore meaningful to him. The child finds this kind of meaning through fairy tales" (1976, p. 5)

Pedagogical Considerations

The pedagogical significance of applying the moral emotional theory to children's literature is that it provides the criteria for selecting books that compel the reader to experience empathically great humanizing values of love and fellowship. The application of this approach to children's literature is important in the way in which it can help students identify and meet their own, and others, needs, feelings, and interests. "Reason, imagination and identification with others produce more considerate behavior" (McPhail, 1972, p. 2). In the elementary school classroom of today, where discipline appears as problematic, teachers often plead for more sensitive students, the ability to put oneself in another's shoes. "Why don't they listen to one another?" "Don't they know how it feels to be called Duck Face?" "Why don't they ever include her in their games?" These are just a few of many questions that teachers may reflect on in the course of one day. Sharing stories with students that elicit empathic responses is one way of leading into the discussion of everyday problems that confront children in and out of school. Questions that might be posed to students after experiencing the story of The Happy

Prince might be: "Why did the swallow keep returning to help the prince?" "What does the swallow get out of it?" "Can you think of something you do that gives you something similar as in the case of the swallow?" "Is there perhaps some feeling you experience after you've done it?" "Is this feeling worth as much to you as a reward you can bring to class and show us?" Developing tolerance toward others might be a healthy result of sharing with students such books that can be analyzed in terms of the moral emotional theory.

Conclusion

What can we conclude from the above application of the clue structures to selected children's books? It would appear that to a surprising extent such clue structures seem to show the potential value which a book may hold for a vicarious moral growth experience in children. A budding pubescent who is experiencing the typical ego-crises, value confusions, and self-doubts associated with rapid physical and psychological changes may find in Judy Blume's book the value clarifying life experiences which a teacher senses could be helpful to the child. One could argue that good teachers do this all the time and that the formulation of clue structures are simply artificial abstractions from the kind of knowledge teachers already have. This is no doubt true. It is the contribution of Polanyi's concepts of tacit knowledge and clues which provides further insights into our everyday teaching experiences. The significance of clue structure analyses such as performed in this chapter probably lies in the process of bringing to reflective awareness and to language what

teachers otherwise may or may not be able to articulate for themselves.

The other objection, that clue structures (as represented by the schemas) are still only abstractions from real experiences is also valid. It is for this reason that the next chapters (V, VI) are meant to focus down to gain a more thorough grasp of the meaning of moral growth from the perspective of the moral-emotional approach in order to distinguish a phenomenological orientation from the traditional empirical formulations. The phenomenological perspective should then provide the opportunity to turn back to the lived experience of a moral emotional reading of Oscar Wilde's The Happy Prince.

Chapter V

FOCUSING DOWN: THE MORAL EMOTIONAL APPROACH

In this chapter one of the four moral growth approaches (discussed and illustrated in Chapters III and IV) is isolated in order to pursue a more detailed and deeper understanding of what is meant by it. Two general research orientations to moral emotional growth are examined: the empirical-analytic and the phenomenological orientation. From the point of view of these research orientations the idea of moral emotional growth has quite different implications for curriculum and teaching. The central idea of the moral emotional approach is its focus on the emotional empathic faculties. What is meant by the word "empathy"? What is the curricular significance of the concept of empathy for children's literature? How does a more phenomenological approach to empathy differ from the more traditional formulations as found in the literature?

The Concept of Empathy

The English term "empathy" is a translation of the German word Einfühlung ("feeling in," or "feeling together with") which derives from the Greek em-patheia ("in passion"). J. B. Hunsdahl (1967) traces the first usage of the term Einfühlung back to 1873 when Robert Vischer used it to refer to the "immediate continuation of an external observation in an inner feeling" (p. 181). The English term "empathy" was first employed probably by E. B. Titchener in a text on experimental

psychology in 1909. Since then the terms "Einfühlung" and "empathy" have been discussed and defined in a variety of ways. Examples drawn from the literature to illustrate that variance follow:

- a. Empathy occurs in the moment one human being speaks with another. It is impossible to understand another individual if it is impossible at the same time to identify oneself with him. (A. Adler, 1965)
- b. Empathy is the involuntary, at times forceful, experiencing of another person's emotional state. (M. Hoffman, 1976)
- c. Empathy is a process of comprehending in which a temporary fusion of self-object boundaries, as in the earliest pattern of object relation, permits an immediate emotional apprehension of the affective experience of another, this sensing being used by the cognitive functions to gain understanding of the other. (A. Guiora, 1967)
- d. Empathy (decentration) is the ability to consider multiple perspectives of a situation. (Piaget, 1969)
- e. Empathy is the ability to predict the behavior of the generalized other. (W. A. Kerr and B. Speroff, 1954)
- f. Empathy is the ability or tendency to put oneself in the other's place, imaginatively, and to feel like him, or with him, or merely to identify his feelings, thoughts, or moral viewpoint. (M. Rotenberg, 1974)
- g. Empathy (cognitive sympathy) is perceiving, sharing, or understanding another person's communicated mental state without feeling compassion for him. (C. Cooley, 1902)
- h. Passive-primitive sympathy is a suffering with or experiencing someone's emotion without perceiving or knowing its origin (i.e., the sheer affective level). Active-complex sympathy is the reciprocal relations in which each side not only experiences the other's emotions but expects his active sharing of this emotion (i.e., the cognitive-affective level). (W. McDougall, 1908)
- i. Empathy (Einfühlung) is the cognitive or intuitive ability to put oneself in the other's place, to identify or predict accurately responses, thoughts, feelings, etc. without actually experiencing that person's feeling or state. (T. Lipps in M. Rotenberg, 1974)
- j. Empathy is the ability to see, feel, respond, and understand as if one were the other person. (G. H. Mead, 1934)

- k. Empathy is the vicarious emotional response of a perceiver to the emotional experience of a perceived object.
(N. Feshbach and K. Roe, 1968)
- l. Empathy is the subject's ability to predict another person's responses on a personality test or in some social situation.
(R. Dymond, 1949)
- m. Fellow-feeling is the ascription of reality to the subject whose feelings we share. (M. Scheler, 1970)
- n. Empathy is the exclusion of one's own concreteness, the extinguishing of the actual situation of life, the absorption in pure aestheticism of the reality in which one participates.
(M. Buber, 1974)

Extraction of the above definitions of "empathy" and "Einfühlung" from the literature has revealed, philosophically speaking, that the research and writings seem to fall into two large knowledge domains. One body of knowledge (by far the largest in the literature) explores the concept of empathy in an empirical-analytic or nomothetic frame. The main preoccupations of these authors seem to be with gaining a causal, correlational grasp of the role of empathy in human behavior, child development, etc. The aim is to find predictive and explanatory measures and hypothetico-deductive knowledge which eventually might help to bring empathy under the "effective" influence of educators, parents, school psychologists, and so forth. In this chapter an attempt will be made to highlight some of the aspects of this work. But it will be argued also that the weakness of the empirical-analytic literature on empathy is that it glosses over the very meaning of empathy as it is "lived."

The other body of knowledge on empathy represented by those who view empathy as defined previously in items (j), (m) and (n) is less prolific; it explores the significance of empathy in a

phenomenological or dialectical-hermeneutic frame. Whereas the empirical-analytic literature focuses on nomothetic concerns, that is, on the law-like generalizations, cause-effect principles, or the statistical correlations between selected variables, the phenomenological literature deepens out the meaning aspects, the verstehende, or the interpretive components of the existential structure of empathy.

How pervasive the empirical-analytic orientation is in the theorizing about empathy can be gleaned also from articles such as Deutsch's and Males' (1975) essay "Empathy: Historic and Current Conceptualizations, Measurement, and a Cognitive Theoretical Perspective." The article is strong on "measurement" but limited in scope on "conceptualization;" due in part, no doubt, to the focus of the reviewers. Their preoccupations with nomothetic and "technical" questions, are clearly demonstrated in the following succinct conclusions, wherein the authors seem to be urgently seeking support for

a theoretical framework for the multiple selection of independent and dependent variables which are related theoretically to empathy. In this fashion a developmental approach could be applied for assessing empathy over time as a function of multiple factors or changes in the patterning of various empathy measures throughout the life span. (Deutsch and Susman, 1974, p. 283)

The Empirical-Analytic Orientation to the Study of Empathy

As has been mentioned above, most studies concerned with empathy seem to be empirical rather than phenomenological in nature. Many psychologists and sociologists have written about empathy in terms of

its development, its characteristics, and its potentiality to be fostered: egocentrism and decentralization (Piaget, 1969); levels of social perspective taking and empathic development in children (Selman, 1975); development of empathic ability in young children, cross-cultural studies (Borke, 1971); empathic capacity and second language acquisition (Guiora, 1967); affective and cognitive role taking—sympathy and empathy in delinquent and nondelinquent boys (Rotenberg, 1974); concept of identification (Kagan, 1958); altruistic sympathy—reinforcement in children (Aronfreed, 1968); empathy scale for the measurement of empathic ability (Dymond, 1949); empathy test (Kerr, 1954); development of altruistic motives (Hoffman, 1976); empathy and aggression in children (Murphy, 1977); and nature and uses of empathy (Katz, 1963).

Most empiricists seem to agree that empathy may be viewed as the ability to escape from one's own view of the world and put oneself in the place of another. There is some disagreement among empiricists as to when empathy occurs. Piaget's position (1969) is that empathy is a discontinuous process: Young children are egocentric and the ability to empathize (take another's perspective) emerges in early adolescence. Borke (1971) seems to take the opposite viewpoint that empathy originates in infancy and proceeds through hierarchical stages closely related to cognitive development. The affective ability to master empathy has been observed by Murphy (1937) in children upward from nursery school age. A point of debate which receives much attention among empiricists is whether empathy involves cognitive and/or affective elements. Feshbach and Roe (1968)

conceive of empathy as a primarily affective phenomenon. Empathy in this sense is a vicarious emotional response of a perceiver to the emotional experience of a perceived object. Dymond (1949), on the other hand, conceives of empathy as a primarily cognitive phenomenon. In her study of the relationship between insight and empathy, she asked subjects to tell stories to TAT cards and analyze their stories in terms of interpersonal relations. Empathy was defined as the ability to experience and describe the thoughts and feelings of the figures depicted in the given stories. In Dymond's empathic abilities test (1949), the measure of empathic ability was derived from seeing how closely the individual predictions of another's ratings corresponded with the other's actual ratings. Guiora (1967) seems to include both the affective and cognitive correlates of empathy in a happy balance. The emotional apprehension of another's experience is sensed affectively and is then used by the cognitive functions to gain understanding of the other's experience.

Three Educational Frameworks for the Acquisition of Empathy

Discussion of the literature and reported research findings related to the empirical-analytic approach has been divided into three categories, each exemplifying a framework for looking at empathy. Each framework has its own underlying assumptions and implications or, at least, potential suggestions for education.

Empathy as Something to be Taught

This way of looking at empathy seems to assume that it can be studied and described as a discrete trait. For the teacher this means a child either may "have" or "not have" it. Another implication seems to be that from this perspective empathy can be treated as a substantive piece of curriculum content; namely as a skill, an ability, or an awareness that can be taught, "passed on" to the child.

Research studies that seem to fit this framework include those of Dymond's empathy scale (1949); Kerr and Speroff's empathy test and primary empathic ability test (1954); Aronfreed's altruistic sympathy—reinforcement in children (1968); Feshbach and Roe's empathy in six- and seven-year olds (1968); Guiora's empathic capacity and second language acquisition (1967); and Rotenberg's empathy in delinquent and nondelinquent boys (1974). Typically, in this form of research statistical procedures are employed to measure indices of empathic behavior by correlating it to other theoretical constructs such as (a) adjective checklists, (b) personality inventories, and (c) attitude scales (Rotenberg, 1974, p. 179).

A typical study of this empirical-analytic framework is represented in the work of Rotenberg (1974). Rotenberg set out to investigate to what extent empirical measures of empathy (affective role taking) and sympathy (cognitive role taking) are present or absent in a comparative experiment with delinquent and nondelinquent boys. Without going into the procedural detail of Rotenberg's study, it suffices to look at his conclusions which seem to show that delinquent

boys do not differ significantly in sympathetic or cognitive role taking behavior, but the study did suggest a difference in decreased affective role taking behavior (empathy) of the delinquent boys as compared to the nondelinquent boys. Significantly, in this study, empathy seems to be treated as some "thing" to be considered as an asset (something you "have") or as a deficiency (something you "lack"). One could speculate that the practical or pedagogic implication of this research is that delinquent boys need help in this area—they need to be taught to be empathic (if this is indeed possible).

Attempts have been made to teach empathic competencies to teachers in competency-based training settings. An unsubstantiated study completed at Syracuse may illustrate to what behavioral extremes such a training process can lead. In this study, behavioral equivalents of empathic "internals" were systematically acquired through training. For example, behavior such as eye contact, physical posture, voice timbre, etc., were considered to constitute external referents of a complex repertoire of empathic competencies. Teachers were taught the importance of imitating the behaviors of the person with whom they were supposed to empathize, such as putting the hand under the chin, tilting the head, crossing the legs, etc. They were trained in ways of establishing and maintaining eye contact, imitating a person's way of speaking, etc. The problem is that this kind of exercise tends to gloss over what actually "happened inside" the hearts and minds of the people involved in such interactions.

Empathy is Something to be Fostered

This way of looking at empathy seems to assume that it can be studied and described as an innate, typically human trait. From this empirical-analytic frame empathy tends to be seen as something that is latently there and that can be "brought out" given the right kind of childhood experiences, socialization practices, etc.

In the literature there are reports of those who treat empathy as something that can be fostered however, without placement of this process within the developmental or stage progression process. For example, educators, such as Hoffman (1976) and McPhail (1973), are both interested in different ways of studying empathy in terms of fostering it in the child. Their focus often is on the conditions that facilitate empathic behavior in children; the kinds or modes of experiences that influence the emergence or non-emergence of empathy are explored.

In addition to presenting a theory of how egoistic and altruistic motivation develop in the individual, Hoffman (1976) offers a suggestion for influencing the emergence of empathy. In reviewing the theories of empathic growth in children he notes that through the developmental behaviors of role taking and strengthening of ego-identity, empathic distress becomes transformed into sympathetic distress. In turn, altruistic motives such as cooperation and charity develop out of the synthesis of empathic distress and the child's increasingly sophisticated sense of the other. In other words, the capacity for empathy has direct consequences for the more mature capacity for fellowship, cooperation, and love. Since the original

experiences of distress in others is hypothesized to lead to the child's empathic responses Hoffman (1976) suggests that:

Sensitivity to the needs and feelings of others may be fostered by allowing the child to have the normal run of distress experiences, rather than shielding him from them, so as to provide a broad base for empathic and sympathetic stress in early years. (p. 142)

Hoffman seems to be suggesting that the right kind of distress experiences in early childhood triggers off the child's natural disposition for empathic feeling and acting. The implications of Hoffman's theory for education are powerful, and yet questionable. On one hand, Hoffman seems to make available to educators an affective knowledge base for promoting an important educational goal. On the other hand, one wonders whether the school is an appropriate place for the kinds of stress experiences about which Hoffman speaks. This raises the question whether distressing and unsettling experiences that may be gained vicariously through novels, film and other media could similarly constitute the kinds of determinants for empathic growth that Hoffman discusses. It is entirely possible that empathic growth through distress should only be considered the prerogative of parents.

McPhail (1973), a British educator, also is convinced of the positive value of empathic growth. For example, McPhail has prepared a series of situations which are designed to involve the student in identifying and meeting his own, and others, needs, feelings and interests. This sensitivity approach aims to foster empathic behavior in the student by emphasizing the person who acts and the consequences of his actions. The assumption underlying this approach is that "reason, imagination and identification with

others produce more considerate behavior" (1973, p. 2). McPhail does not explicate the theoretic assumptions (discussed in Chapter II) which underlie his curriculum program. In other words, he does not problematize whether the fostering of empathy can be effectively controlled by the teacher in the classroom in the first place: he simply sets out to do it.

Empathy as Something to be Acquired Developmentally

The proponents of the third framework of empathic behavior seem to suggest that empathic growth is a natural human process but to this process we can discern certain stages, levels, etc. It has in common with the idea that empathy can be fostered the assumption that empathy is a potential and natural characteristic which develops under the conditions of appropriate environmental stimulation.

Developmentalists such as Piaget (1969), Kagan (1958), Mead (1934) and Baldwin (1906) consider empathy as a role-taking skill conducted in a developmental framework. Terms such as "social perspective taking," "social sensitivity," "insight," "projection," and "identification" are attached to and used interchangeably with empathy. Empathic ability rather than empathic understanding seems to be the focal point. Questions such as the following receive attention: When does empathy occur? Does empathy have other cognitive stage correlates? What experiences are critical for the development of empathy? Selman (1975) uses the Piagetian-Kolbergian developmental approach to describe successive stages in the development of empathy in the child.

Selman calls empathic responses "social perspective taking." There are developmental levels of empathic understanding when the child is able to perceive socially (empathically). Becoming cognizant of these stages and being able to determine at which particular stage the child is functioning would provide the educator with the understanding of how the child looks at the world. According to Selman, expectations of conceptual and emotional abilities that the child has not yet developed would be avoided. And even more important, the teacher would possess the knowledge to direct the child to the next stage of development. Selman says that the teacher who recognizes the social-cognitive stages of her students can:

1. better understand the behavior of her class by understanding how her children view social relationships, rights, and obligations;
2. determine her own expectations for her students' developmental goals;
3. better estimate the affective as well as cognitive capacity of children (in T. Lickona, 1976, p. 310).

Conclusions of the Empirical-Analytic Orientation

Summing up these discussions, it would seem that empirical-analytic research findings may be classified into three categorical frameworks depending upon the underlying assumptions about the origins and genesis of empathy in human behavior. However, seen common to all three perspectives is that they all strive for a form of knowledge which has the practical potential of bringing empathy under increased

predictive and effective control. This striving is exemplified in the following research suggestions made by Abraham S. Luchins:

1. research the effects of the differences in attitude and situations on the empathizer and the object of empathy,
2. research what effect different people have on the empathizer.
3. research how a non-human object or an event compares to a person as the object of empathy,
4. research mutual empathy, the way in which two people or groups understand one another,
5. research under what conditions empathy seems most apparent or least apparent for an individual or in a group,
6. research how to increase or decrease the amount of empathy for an individual or a group (1957, p. 15).

The potential contribution of empirical-analytic research on empathy for teachers is that it may yield "methods," "strategies," "procedures," or "techniques" for effective teaching, fostering, or promoting (developmentally) empathic behavior. Aside from the fact that research of this kind has been notoriously unsuccessful in informing concrete educational practices, there are other limitations to the empirical-analytic approach as well. One of the most basic shortcomings of this approach may well be that it well-nigh completely glosses over the very meaning of empathy. Interpretations of meaning in the experimental literature are significantly restricted to operational (i.e., testable, observable, measurable) formulations. It may be that a competent pedagogy on the part of teachers and other

educators is not primarily a function of their instrumental access to skills, techniques, and other such behavioral competencies. Rather, one might at least speculate that in the realm of empathic growth something more fundamental is required. In the following section the phenomenological orientation to empathy is presented in the hope of bringing to the surface the deeper meaning structures of the experience of empathy.

The Phenomenological Orientation to the Study of Empathy

The existential-phenomenological approach to empathy attempts to interpret the meaning aspects of the structure of empathy. In contrast to the empirical tradition, very few studies, recent or past, have been written phenomenologically on the topic of empathy. In Germany there was some interest in the idea of empathy among philosophers and psychologists in the first quarter of the twentieth century. Reportedly, Theodor Lipps wrote extensively on the subject. However, none of his work appears to be available in English. The only access to Lipps' work is by way of secondary articles and authors who quote and refer to Lipps' work. For example, Hunsdahl (1967) provides an introductory overview of Lipps' works, as well he discusses briefly how authors such as Prandtl, Meyer, Deri, Doring, Volkert, and Muller-Freienfels have debated and contributed to Lipps' work.

The first German work on empathy that has been translated into the English language is Scheler's The Nature of Sympathy. This work is especially interesting since, in contrast to Lipps and other authors cited by Hunsdahl, Scheler's work stands more firmly in the

direct tradition of Husserl's phenomenological writings. Scheler reserved the term Einfühlung for a kind of relationship that is evident only among human beings. He defined Einfühlung as a cognitive and unconscious process, a "reproduced feeling" in which "we sense the quality of the other's feeling, without it being transmitted to us, or evoking a similar real emotion in us" (1970, p. 9). We may understand the other's emotion or we may feel as one with him (total identification). In none of these instances, says Scheler, do we feel genuine sympathy. Empathy in Scheler's terms, seems very much like the way in which a clinical psychologist such as Carl Rogers might describe it.

The state of empathy, or being empathic, is to perceive the internal frame of reference of another with accuracy, and with the emotional components and meanings which pertain thereto, as if one were the other person, but without ever losing the "as if" condition. Thus it means to sense the hurt or the pleasure of another as he senses it, and to perceive the causes thereof as he perceives them, but without ever losing the recognition that it is as if I were hurt or pleased, etc. If this "as if" quality is lost, then the state is one with identification. (1951, pp. 210-211)

On reading Scheler, it becomes apparent that he is deeply caught up with some experience that in layman's terms seems somewhat akin to "putting oneself in the other person's shoes." Scheler calls this experience Mitgefühl or fellow-feeling, "the ascription of reality to the subject whose feelings we share" (1970, p. 10). Authentic fellow-feeling recognizes, meets, and respects unequivocally the subjectivity of another human existence in a genuine encounter. Scheler regards Einfühlung (in Lipps' terms) as a reproduction of feeling or experience; the empathizer does not "feel the other's feeling"; he simply knows or judges that the other has it and may remain quite indifferent to what has evoked the feeling. Einfühlung then for Scheler stays within the

cognitive sphere. But fellow-feeling is more than Einfühlung—it is the experience that Scheler describes as one in which we can sense more than just the quality of the other's feeling. The act of fellow-feeling becomes more understandable by uncovering and examining some aspects and features that Scheler distinguishes about this phenomenon.

The Structures of Fellow-Feeling

An attempt will be made to describe the deep structures of fellow-feeling, in the sense of Scheler (1970), with the intent of providing a more theoretical explanation of the existential meaning of empathy as well as its pedagogical significance to educators.

1. Fellow-feeling is a reaction or a reactive condition. According to Scheler, "fellow-feeling based on emotional reproduction whether in commiseration or rejoicing, is essentially something undergone, and not a spontaneous act. It is a reaction, not an action" (p. 67).

2. "Pure fellow-feeling is an intrinsic characteristic of the human spirit" (p. 61). Fellow-feeling does not have its roots and is not determined by our relationships with other people and their emotional states, but it is assisted in its opportunity for emergence and display by other people.

3. Fellow-feeling is not restricted to other's experiences that we have already met in ourselves. "True fellow-feeling is wholly functional throughout: there is no reference to the state of one's own feelings" (p. 41).

4. Fellow-feeling includes the existence and character of

the other as part of the object of commiseration or rejoicing. "All fellow-feeling involves intentional reference of the feeling of joy or sorrow to the other person's experience" (p. 13).

5. Fellow-feeling presupposes that we have knowledge of the nature and quality of experience in other people. It occurs after the experience of the other has been grasped cognitively. The development of fellow-feeling is due to the growth in our understanding of the nature and differences of mental processes in other people. "It is through fellow-feeling that 'other minds in general' are brought home to us, in individual cases, as having a reality equal to our own" (p. 98).

6. The act of fellow-feeling has moral value independent of the content of the sympathetic act. "Genuine acts of fellow-feeling have positive moral value" (p. 138). The degree of moral value in acts of fellow-feeling is determined according to

- a. the level of the emotion, which may be a spiritual, mental, vital or sensory type of sympathy,
- b. whether the sympathy is 'pity with someone' or 'pity for someone,'
- c. whether the fellow-feeling is directed upon the centre of self-awareness and self-respect in the other's personality or merely towards his circumstances,
- d. the worth of the value-situation which is the occasion of the other person's sorrow or joy (to sympathize with joys and sorrows which are appropriate to their circumstances is preferable to sympathizing with those which are not)(pp. 138-139).

7. Fellow-feeling is based on love of some kind and cannot exist unless love is present in some form. "Fellow-feeling depends entirely on the nature and depth of the love involved" (p. 67). The kind of fellow-feeling (community of feeling, fellow-feeling, emotional infection, and emotional identification) that is experienced by the individual depends on the character or nature of the bond that has been established between him and the other.

8. Scheler (1970) contends that one of the marks of the genuineness of fellow-feeling is that it should lead to acts of beneficence. In other words, true fellow-feeling should involve an effort towards the well-being of the other.

9. The feelings of the other person for whom we show fellow-feeling are qualitatively different from our own. "The realization that as finite beings we can never see right into one another's heart, that we cannot even have full and adequate knowledge of our own hearts, let alone other people's, is given as an essential feature of fellow-feeling" (p. 66).

10. Fellow-feeling is innate. It is part of the "constitution of all emotional beings generally" (p. 130).

11. "Vicarious and compassionate feeling are basic phenomena, which can only be exhibited as they actually are, without being derivable from other elementary facts on psycho-genetic lines" (p. 56). Scheler rejects the kinds of approaches to fellow-feeling taken by empirical-analytic thinkers, particularly theories of the psychological and genetic type that attempt to understand fellow-feeling by merely tracing its development.

Kinds of Fellow-Feeling

In addition to the above structural aspects Scheler discusses four kinds of fellow-feeling. These can further be distinguished from each other in terms of their inauthenticity and genuineness.

"Community of feeling" is completely genuine, and "fellow-feeling" proper is genuine but less so. "Emotional infection" is inauthentic fellow-feeling, and "emotional identification" is only a heightened form of emotional infection.

Community of feeling is a mode of experiencing described as a "feeling-in-common." For example, the anguish that two parents would feel at the bedside of their beloved dying child is shared mental suffering. Sensory types of feelings cannot be experienced in this way. The value content of the feeling and the emotional regard of the feeling are identical.

Fellow-feeling can be described as a mode of experiencing which is a "re-action" to the state and value of the other's feeling. Countless examples of rejoicing in another's joy or commiserating with another's sorrow would fall into this category. The value content of the feeling and the emotional regard of the feeling are phenomenologically two different facts.

Emotional infection is a mode of experiencing wherein there is no genuine fellow-feeling. It involves a "transference" of a state of feeling. The presupposition of any knowledge of what the other feels is lacking. Emotional infection is involuntary and unconscious. It is most often experienced in the mass excitement of a crowd where the

incoming infective emotion is not ascribed to others, but is regarded as one's own. Only in its motivating origins does emotional infection relate back to some other person's experience.

Emotional identification involves a mode of experiencing which is a modelling of the self with another. Emotional identification is involuntary and unconscious. Scheler cites two types of identification: (1) idiopathic and (2) heteropathic, both of which develop in opposite ways. Idiopathic identification develops through "the total eclipse and absorption of another self by one's own" (p. 18). An example might be that members of a political party ecstatically supporting their leader, engender a sense of identity for themselves through him. Heteropathic identification occurs when the subject is "overwhelmed and hypnotically bound and fettered" by the other to the extent that the subject is usurped of his status by the other's personality. The art of acting might be considered a form of heteropathic identification as the actor effaces his own personality in that of the character he is portraying.

Conclusions of the Phenomenological Orientation

What does the process of understanding phenomenologically the underlying structures of empathy and understanding the distinguishing features of the kinds of empathy explicated by Scheler offer the teacher or educator? Langeveld (1967) notes that social science has taught us much that we can empirically observe about children, and learning behavior, but we know too little about the child as a way of being human. Science (in a behavioral sense) forgets that pedagogy is

essentially a moral and intersubjective enterprise. Fellow-feeling in a phenomenological sense does not ignore the child's subjectivity. It recognizes, meets, and respects the subjectivity of another human existence in a genuine encounter. Understanding empathy phenomenologically might help the language arts teacher to interpret the inner experiences of the child, and assist the child in coming to terms with and transcending the constraints that stand in the way of a reflective and autonomous passage toward responsible adulthood. In the words of Beekman, "a phenomenological approach can contribute to a more humanized theory of schooling" (1977, p. 94).

Understanding the distinguishing features of the kinds of fellow-feeling (community of feeling, fellow-feeling, emotional infection, and emotional identification) can provide the teacher with the insight to recognize genuine or inauthentic empathic behavior in his or her students. The kind of student who is timid, withdrawn, and seems unable to express a sense of individuality or another student who seems to be unaware of his classmate's feelings and attitudes might be more sensitively dealt with by the teacher who is conversant with the kinds of empathy and their distinguishing features. The intent of all pedagogic or educational knowledge is practical only in the sense that it is meaningful in concrete situations where the adult or educator meets the child or student.

In what way can teachers benefit from a closer attention to phenomenological writings (as contrasted with empirical-analytic literature) on empathy? It would seem that phenomenology may add to an educator's practical competence by bringing the pedagogic

significance of selected phenomena to reflective awareness. It is doubtful that the assigned reading of Scheler's The Nature of Sympathy, for example, would make for better "pedagogical sense" in teachers. But a careful scrutiny of selected aspects of the distinctions made by Scheler, and application and further phenomenological description of these distinctions might render the phenomenology of empathy more meaningful for concrete practical educational situations. Selected phenomenological descriptions on topics which lie within the realm of pedagogy and the language-arts, in particular, may be needed. For example, such perceptive analyses might describe how the young child concretely experiences (perceives, feels, understands, etc.) a piece of literature which centers on Scheler's moral idea of fellow-feeling. What happens to a ten-year-old child who is read to by his or her teacher a subtle story of, for example, Oscar Wilde's The Happy Prince, Betsy Byar's The Midnight Fox, H. C. Andersen's The Little Mermaid, or Ivan Southall's Josh? The perceptive teacher must often wonder what goes on in the mind of the child who reacts to such stories with visible emotional involvement and yet, in the same class of children, there are others to whom the empathic experience seems to go completely unnoticed. What is it about some language arts sources that can structure a simple reading lesson into a pedagogic situation where the empathic experience becomes the educationally significant one? This is not a technical question; that is, this is not a question that is most appropriately explored through hypothesis testing, experiments; instead, this question is an interpretive one leading to hermeneutic probes into carefully selected elements of the human life-world: the pedagogic

situation. Therefore, in the next chapter the concrete, personal nature of the reading experiences of groups of children will be explored to reveal whether or not there is evidence of an emotional moral growth dimension of the experience.

Chapter VI

THE READING EXPERIENCE OF THE CHILD

On the Phenomenology of Reading

In Chapter V the moral emotional approach was examined. The phenomenological orientation to moral emotional growth in particular and its focus on empathy seems most appropriate for the task of examining the child's experience of reading a selected fairy tale.

This chapter is concerned with the question, "What is a reading experience like for a child?" More specifically the question is, "What is it like for a young child to read a fairy tale of an emotional moral kind?" However, in focussing the question down to such level of specificity (so that for the time being we do not seem to be interested in the child's experience of other forms or varieties of literature) we should not forget that we are asking about the nature of the child's relationship with written language which we call reading. Talking with children about their experience of fairy tale stories (i.e., reading and/or listening) such as "The Happy Prince" and "The Selfish Giant" are, in a sense, occasions for theorizing, that is, for dwelling in the question of the nature of the reading experience for a child.

From a pedagogical point of view, the concern is that children read stories which in some way or another are felt to be consequential rather than irrelevant, profound rather than trivial,

and thus oriented to growth, to knowledge, to maturity. As teachers or parents we frequently seem to act on an intuitive basis of what we sense to be "good" for a child without, however, reflecting profoundly on the nature of the experiences into which we coax, or deliberately or inadvertently guide the child. If the pedagogic meaning of education implies that we help or guide the child into a 'world,' then reading, as an intimate relationship with language is such a world. On the one hand, educators have greatly enriched our understanding of the reading process (Goodman, 1965; Rudde1, 1963; Stauffer, 1969). On the other hand, paradoxically, they seem to have glossed entirely the question of the nature of the reading experience itself.

A particular type of theorizing, of posing and dwelling in the question of the reading experience, is virtually absent in the literature. The absent or forgotten form of theorizing which needs to be discussed is the hermeneutics of the reading experience—hermeneutic theory. Therefore, the question in need of addressing (of theorizing) is, "What is the reading experience like for a young child who reads a story to himself?" And more specifically, "How can the child's language (talk) about a reading experience be seen as a source for clues regarding the tacit nature of personal knowledge as the child is involved in a reading experience of a moral kind?" When a child reads a story of an emotional moral kind what is it about the language of the story that seems to make the child somehow different, changed (this term is used loosely) after he has read it? Whether the child can order story events, recall details correctly, draw conclusions

or make character inferences is not a major concern. What is important is the shared communication between the author, text, and the child. Or better, what is of interest is the question of the nature of the experience the child has with the language. The interpretation process may have something to do with the "magic" there is for the child in moving into the world of the story and sharing the characters' thoughts and lives.

A theoretical orientation that serves to explore these questions must be able to uncover the tacit dimension of language and speech. This is not the same as conceptual or textual analysis. The problem should not be seen as the attempt of making language crystal clear and arranging it before us as if it were an object. Instead, hermeneutic interpretation helps us to "dig up" what is buried in our everyday, pre-reflective experience. The child's reading experience should be explored in such a way as to show the "structure" of the lived experience in a light which gets at the essence of this experience. It is important, therefore, that the child is not studied as an object for research manipulation. The child's language is not being analyzed for linguistic aspects of cognitive, affective, or moral development, and so on. Whether the child is at this stage or that stage of human development is of little consequence for the question posed.

In order to set the hermeneutic interest in theorizing about the nature of the reading experience in perspective against the more traditional forms of theorizing it may be useful to differentiate between what Merleau-Ponty (1962) terms "thematic" or "objective"

knowledge and "non-thematic" or phenomenological knowledge. The point of this comparison is to suggest that existing theories of the reading experiences of children are of a thematic sort while the type of theorizing needed to pursue the question of the nature of the reading experience of the young child requires a phenomenological form of theorizing. It is phenomenological knowledge as theory which I am proposing to address for the purpose of understanding more deeply the question of what it is like for the young child to read a particular story which has a moral growth component.

When we ask, "What is a certain experience like?" then, we are asking for the nature, the "isness" or essence of the experience. In other words, what we wish to understand is the lived experience of reading which is (ironically) pre-predicative and pre-thematic, and which can be recovered (not introspectively) but by reflection. This form of reflection required for recovering the lived experience is phenomenological theorizing. As Merleau-Ponty (1962) states, "Looking for the world's essence is not looking for what it is as an idea once it has been reduced to a theme of discourse; it is looking for what it is as a fact for us before any thematization" (p. XV). Merleau-Ponty seems to advance two main ideas. First, he proposed that theory, in a phenomenological sense, is a constant turning back to the world of lived experience itself—Husserl's (1970) "turning back to the things"—while the theorist actively resists the temptation of thematizing this experience which would mean a cutting up of our experience in order to explain it at the hand of objective observations, concepts, models, generalizations, correlations, laws, and all the

other furnishings which belong to the more traditional (empirical-analytic or objective) approaches to theory development. Secondly, he suggests that the form of knowledge thus generated is itself non-thematic in character. In other words, phenomenological theory (in the sense of Merleau-Ponty, and likeminded theorists) avoids thematic conceptualization and, as a corollary, is of little "use-value" if by "use" we mean that knowledge must provide us with an increased capacity to make more rational some aspect or domain of human endeavor, such as the teaching of reading. It is feasible to argue, however, that theory development which is thus guided by instrumental reason (Habermas' notion of the technical cognitive interest of knowledge) falls, therefore, short of a broader and richer interpretation of rationality and the idea of use-value or practical function of knowledge.

But why in the language arts curriculum do we need a hermeneutic form of theorizing? Why do we need a phenomenology of reading? If prescriptions, managerial recommendations, manipulative techniques or "hands-on" materials and methodologies are being sought, then hermeneutic theory must be seen to be wanting or simply inadequate or inappropriate. If, however, hermeneutics and phenomenological theorizing can be viewed as yielding knowledge which contributes to our resourcefulness in a deeper and more profound sense of pedagogic wisdom then this orientation seems to hold promise.

In this context Heidegger (1977) remarked that the important question is not, "What can we do with this knowledge?" but, "What can phenomenology do with us," If phenomenological knowledge is to make

a difference then it has to be the difference which is made at the level of ontology, of being, of our very being as educators.

Merleau-Ponty's characterization of theorizing as thematization can be seen quite appropriately as a characterization of the sizeable majority of existing theories of reading of children. Here is not the place to document extensively this claim. The predominant concern with the reading experiences of children tends to be concerned with developmental structures, linguistic processes, cognitive functioning, etc. There is another, however, more reflexive way of addressing the question of the good of theory. Ethnomethodologists such as Peter McHugh (1970) and Alan Blum (1978) have a focussed interest in the reflexive nature of theorizing. They have posed, for example, that all forms of everyday accounting for one's actions are in a sense forms of theorizing. In fact, they propose that fundamentally there is no difference between the giving of accounts in everyday life and the theorizing done by social scientists. Theorizing is a form of life we share with practical actors even though we (unreflexively) develop distance (objectivity) from them by making them the subjects of our objective stance (Garfinkle talks about the "duping" of those subjected to the theorizing of social scientists). The point is that we share a life. Likewise, in the sense that everyday actors give ongoing accounts (to their friends, spouses, colleagues, etc.) of the good of their lives, the researcher as theorist has to see his or her theorizing as a life which is a display of a commitment to the good. Of course, scientists usually reformulate this interpretation of the good in terms of the ethics of scientific neutrality,

a commitment to the impartial rules and norms of "acceptable" research methods, etc. A more hermeneutic stance would say that theory is good in the sense that, or to the extent that it serves the good.

There is still something more to be said about the question of the potential contribution of a phenomenology of the reading experience. Much research and theorizing relative to language arts, children's writing, and reading has led to the construction of theories and/or models which are meant to describe the (natural) processes of children's language and cognitive development; for example, Wilkinson, 1980. Ultimately these models are intended to provide us with a "practice." In other words a teacher is asked to, at least in part, give up an embodied set of understandings (Schutz and Luckman, 1973), recipes, routines, "things that worked in the past," intuitions, insights, tacit clues as well as articulated principles for a limited and limiting model which permits "seeing" certain things but may lead to blindness or inattentiveness to others. Socalled theory (theoretical models) tends to be presented as inherently superior to the (sometimes) richness of knowledge educators hold phenomenologically. Instead, questions should be posed, especially in the case of experienced teachers, as to whether the richness of embodied knowledge should be sacrificed (traded, exchanged) for any model or theoretic principle, no matter how clean, well-rounded, and intellectually satisfying the model or principle may be in accord with Occam's razor or some such scientific ideal. In contrast, hermeneutic knowledge does not lend itself to replace existent understandings of a teacher. Rather, it aims to deepen out, and in a profound sense, "enrich" the educator's

personal knowledge. And yet, in spite of the foregoing comments, the intent is not to debunk the utility of passing on so-called "technical" expertise, especially to beginning teachers. In short, it is necessary to recognize the goodness of theories that are good because they "work" and those that are good because they provide teachers with "insights" into the essential nature of our calling.

It is precisely the latter kind of theorizing that asks for the distinction between thematization and the nonthematic. Empirical-analytic and other more positivistic theories of reading cannot proceed without thematization of the phenomenon it studies; that is, children reading. What is done with the reading experience of children may be to give up the whole in favour of the parts. Thematization then involves an isolating of the phenomenon under study from its experiential roots. The aim of traditional theorizing is to fix aspects of the reading experience in clear and determinate concepts, thus decomposing the phenomenon in order to make it more amenable to theoretic conceptualization and subsequent experimentation or objective study and observation. Thematization in this sense means isolating the reading process from its ground in pre-objective experience. The kind of theorizing deemed desirable from a hermeneutic point of view seeks precisely to re-connect the reading of a story with pre-reflective experience.

When the child has a reading experience he enters into a certain relationship with language. Or, to read is to have an experience with language. To clarify this relationship, it is necessary to consider the question of language. What is language?

Educators who study reading do not tend to ask this question in the way in which it should be asked. They (Britton, 1970; Moffet, 1968; Wilkinson, 1980) claim to already know what is the nature of language. And the answer to the question usually is expressed in ways such as these: language is a tool of communication, and a means for cognitive expression; it is an organized means of representing experience, a vehicle for cognition, etc. And the nature of language often is investigated by decomposing speech into its supposed elements, to explain the phenomenon of expression in terms of something else in order to give it clarity.

In the last few years there seems to be a trend developing among language educators that views language more broadly as a way of making sense or making meaning of our world. For example, linguistic analysts treat language conceptually (Rorty, 1979); language is viewed as something that "mirrors" the world (words are the pictures of the world). However, the mirror tends to be foggy, having a distorting effect of producing unreliable images that are ambiguous. And so the task becomes one of conceptual analysis for the purpose of clarifying meaning. As Stanley Rosen (1980) put it, conceptual analysts treat the world as concept. Typical questions posed are: How is language used in this or that situation? What do people mean when they say certain things? Meaning is equated with usage, prompted especially by Wittgenstein's notion of language games.

These ways of looking at language fail to consider ground or ontology, because they reduce the life-world to some sort of cultural relativity. No distinction is made between concepts and that which

stands behind the concepts, between appearance and essence. The concept or conceptual structure is already it. The concept is the thing, that is, mirrors or represents the world (Rorty, 1979). From the viewpoint of conceptualizing theory it is, in a sense, not possible to ask what the reading experience is like, since that which constitutes the original of this likeness is collapsed into a (single) concept or variable, etc. In other words, conceptualizing theory can make no distinction between original and copy (Rosen, 1979) or between Being and being (Merleau-Ponty, 1962; Heidegger, 1977) or between logos and thought (Gadamer, 1975).

Heidegger (1977), Merleau-Ponty (1962) and Gadamer (1975) have written about the profound oneness of language, being and thinking, which is so essential that any kind of conceptual separation begins to get away from the question of what language is. What consequence does this "oneness" have for the analysis of children's reading? In a sense we are not just investigating language but we are interrogating the child, who he is (what speaks through him or her). To get to the essence of the reading experience does not require analysis of what is or what occurs "in the child's head"; instead, recognition that something else is at work through the child is essential. Hermeneutics aims at making visible the "deep structure" of social reality.

To understand the essence of the reading experience of a particular child it is necessary to "get to know" the child, and to recognize oneself in the child. This means "talking" with him about his life, his family, his friends, his dreams, etc. To learn about these things is not small talk—it speaks of his world, our shared

world. It is through speech that the child comes to understand himself and other people as he relates to them through talk. "In speech man finds himself and realizes himself" (Spurling, 1977, p. 54).

The interviewer needs to establish an atmosphere of openness and reciprocity so the child feels free to say what he wishes. This is why Merleau-Ponty says that speech does not translate thought, but accomplishes it. If the purpose of the dialogue is to expose clues of the tacit dimension of the reading experience, then the child's language should be spontaneous and authentic. The talk that is shared between the teacher (theorist) and the child is of the same order as ordinary speech between friends. This is what Gadamer (1975) meant when he referred to the method of hermeneutics as friendship. In understanding the speech of a child, the interviewer must "feel himself into" what the child means by his words. Merleau-Ponty calls this level of speech the "gestural" or existential level from which the conceptual level or interpretive understanding of words is deduced. The gestural level of speech allows us to specify the "horizon of senses" or connotations which permits a clear signification to emerge. The words themselves have emotional content.

It would then be found that the words, vowels and phonemes are so many ways of 'singing' the world, and that their function is to represent things, not, as the naive onomatopoeic theory had it, by reason of an objective resemblance, but because they extract, and literally express, their emotional essence. (Merleau-Ponty, 1962, p. 187)

An understanding of the essence of the reading experience of the child is tied to the expressive power of words. To theorize about the experience is to bring somehow the essential nature of the experience before us. To this end hermeneutic theorizing has to be sensitive to

the potential power of language and to the vigor required to let language speak for itself. One way to theorize, or to bring the essential nature of the reading experience before us is to ask children to listen to a story and to talk about it.

The Personal Nature of a Reading Experience: A Group Discussion

I decided to carry out a small study to attempt to expose clues of the tacit nature of the reading experience. The question that the practical study was concerned with was: What is it like for the student to have a moral experience? More specifically, What is the quality of responsiveness like? Students were read Oscar Wilde's classic fairytale The Happy Prince by their classroom teacher. Two groups, each of four children, were interviewed after the listening experience. The students in Group One were selected because they said that they liked the story. Students in Group Two were chosen because they admitted that they would prefer to listen to another kind of story in their next story time.

Group One

A group of four children, grade four students (Kelly (K), Tim (T), Scott (S), and Robin (R)) are gathered around a table discussing The Happy Prince, a fairy tale by Oscar Wilde. A transcript of the discussion, led by the investigator (I), follows:

I: How many of you thought there were sad moments in the story?

T: Well, I do, I think there were a few when the bird said that I have to go to the Home of Dead or whatever.

K: But that's not sad, I mean. The bird will be happy.

T: No but I mean the Prince was sad about it. It's mother or father would be sad about it too.

S: That was a sad moment when he turned blind like they had to take his eyes out.

. . .

I: In this part of the story, I marked it because everyone groaned. Perhaps you can tell me why everyone groaned. This was the part. "Swallow, Swallow, little Swallow," said the Prince, "will you not stay with me one night longer?"

T: Oh! Ah—

I: And then everyone went ah—oh—ah—.

T: Ah—ah—

K: Well because . . .

T: Well like . . .

I: Please, Kelly, go ahead.

K: Like they think well, geez, they—he already stayed a night, [laughter] let him go to Egypt, for goodness sakes. Gee.

I: Does that fit in with what Robin had to say? She was saying, why didn't he help out the first time and then leave before it got really cold. The swallow knew he was going to freeze to death if he stayed.

K: Well, she may have been afraid to die, but that little thing was helping. But a little bird can't do very much in one day like—do much for a bird—like carry all these things because some of that was half way across the town.

. . .

I: What's so great about helping the Prince?

K: He's saving people's lives, is the point because I mean that little kid he could be really ill and he could die.

T: Like he wants to help.

K: And I'm sure it means a lot.

S: The little . . .

T: It said in the story that he loved the Prince.

I: What does he get out of it? What does the swallow get out of helping the Prince? What does it . . .

K: A happy life in heaven.

T: It gives, it gives, it gives him the feeling that he helped other people.

I: [Noise—all talking at once.] That's interesting. Did you hear what he said? [pointing towards Tim]

K: Yeah. Cause.

I: If you've helped somebody, can you describe what happens inside of you when you do this?

T: Well, it kind of makes you feel better. Like if you do something when you haven't been told or somebody is hurt and you help them, put a band-aid on a cut or something then it makes you feel better cause you help them.

I: Mmm.

. . .

I: You've done really well controlling yourself. You've been waiting to jump in. Kelly, what do you think?

K: The point is, I—I don't like the mayor either. He absolutely lets those people sit there and calls them stupid yet—that they're too lazy to do anything. He's the lazy one. Why can't he get his wife to sew his own clothes or something? I mean these poor people are dying and he should do something like white gift or something and give the poor people something each year eh? This guy leaves the poor people sitting there helpless on the roads and stuff. I mean he should give them a little food, give them heat, you know, give them something!

S: Well, if he was the poor person and they were the—

T: Yeah, how would he feel like if—I heard him say.

K: If they had a better heart and they'd do it. If they've got a good heart now I think if they were fat and dumpy like him they [laughter] I'm sure that they'd have a heart for him.

I: But he's got it made though. He's in a position of power.

T: Oh yeah I know but if I were in his position I'd help him cause I heard him in a part of the story. After the Happy Prince he said, "Man, he looks shabby, tear him down! He

looks like a beggar in the streets." You know, that kind of makes me feel weird, like different about him talking about beggars.

These students were affected forcefully by the story. The book seemed to possess a quality that took these students beyond mere cognitive understanding, toward the heights of feeling and experiencing. The language of these children reflected their experience of the feelings of "love" and "compassion" that the prince showed toward the poor. The students identified with the story characters' needs, feelings, and interests. Through discussing the story with a small group of classmates, the students became more aware of affective states, their own and others. Noticeably, the students who were moved by the story, were able to use language as an abstract symbol system. It is obvious from the analysis of the transcripts that the children in Group Two experience the same story differently.

Group Two

A second group of four children, grade four students from the same class as were members of Group One (Vincent, Scott, Wanita and Kim) are gathered around a table discussing The Happy Prince. A transcript of the discussion led by the investigator follows:

I: You all said that you didn't find the story really sad. What did you think of it? Go ahead Vincent.

V: B-O-R-I-N-G.

I: Why?

V: Well, all the sad parts and I

S: I sort of thought it was mixed up.

V: I thought it was like a soap opera.

S: Partly sad and . . .

I: But you found it boring Vincent. Did you sort of drift off to sleep in parts?

V: Drift off to look at my stamp collection [laughs] it was so boring.

I: Why—any idea or do you just have that feeling?

V: Yeah, well I really don't watch those soap operas and I think It's like a soap opera—everything happening to everybody and the Prince losing his eye and everything.

W: I thought it was kind of gross. [laughter] Gross?

I: Why? That's kind of interesting.

W: Because when the bird had to pluck out his eyes I thought that was really gross.

I: What do you mean, really gross?

V: Yeah, uck!

W: Like if you have no eye, now that is gross.

K: Yeah.

S: Well, I saw a person at the playground and they have a strap around the eye because they have no eye.

V: Once I saw a guy that lost his arm.

S: Yeah, there was a guy on TV and he had two arms missing and he could shoot a bow and arrow right in the middle, and he could drive a car, and he could get his wallet out of his back pocket. It was really cruel.

K: And there was this man and he had um one of his legs missing and he could do sit-ups with one and he could do uh he can jump over a pole that big, no this big with one and—

V: You mean that high.

K: Yeah, that high and—

I: I bet everyone has a story they could tell that's similar to the ones you have told—but if you didn't like the story what kinds of stories do you like? Vincent.

This transcript is not continued because the discussion that remained contained similar recounting of television and personal

experiences unrelated to the fairy tale. The children in Group Two showed little interest or involvement in this story. The strong emotive component of the story seemed to disturb these children; talking about the story was bothersome. Instead, recounting and reporting events from movie and television worlds, citing examples of gruesome situations, comparing details of personal experiences were more comfortable and worthy topics for discussion. The language of these children was less symbolic, imaginative, and socialized. It did not include questions, answers, requests, and information that had undergone adaptation to take into consideration the demands of other listeners. In the Anthology of Children's Literature, Johnson writes that from his reading of fairytales the child should,

gain the habit of wonder; a robust sense of humor; the ability to find enchantment in the most common day, and the power to thrust his imagination beyond himself and the limits of ignorance. (1970, p. 122)

Obviously for some children this is not so.

It appeared, however, that some children had been morally and emotionally engaged in the story, The Happy Prince, while other children either did not experience such engagement or, if they did, responded qualitatively in a manner which suggests a shallow and a (morally) inconsequential language experience. From the above transcripts it would appear that a teacher who is interested in providing for opportunities of moral growth a certain pedagogic tact and perceptiveness is required; as well as a "closeness" to her children which is difficult to achieve in an experimental classroom setting where the investigator utilizes an unfamiliar set of classes. Even

so, it is immediately evident from the transcripts that some children demonstrate in their own speech an authentic engagement while others do not. It may well be an unwarranted, but widespread assumption among educators that learning is a continuous growth phenomenon. It is entirely possible to assume that learning (in the present context) is discontinuous and that in provisions for learning of a certain kind do not necessarily engage every child in an authentic experience. At any rate, this assumption of the discontinuity phenomenon in children's maturation seems to be borne out by the evidential nature and quality of responses of the group of children who apparently were not "addressed" by the "call" of the fairy tale as outlined above.

One should further question what we mean when we say that a child has a language learning experience when as educators we are hard-pressed to describe what a learning experience in fact consists of. This is an issue which is taken up in the final chapter of this study.

The results of the study may have been more meaningful and authentic if the study had been carried out by myself with my own class. This problem became apparent in the selection of the teacher and students for the study. Factors which were found to limit the study were: (1) the selection of a teacher who values literature highly and makes it an intrinsic part of classroom life, (2) the kinds of writing and reflection experiences of the students, (3) the quality of teacher-student rapport, and (4) the teacher's way of presenting and reading the story (e.g., "being at one" with the story).

It became apparent, after working with groups of children, that

the process of exposing the clues of the nature of the child's reading experience is a complicated and difficult task. One further attempt was made to get to the essence of the reading experience. It seemed wise to narrow the study to a single child. Anton was chosen because he was sensitive, liked books, would talk freely, was available to participate and I, having known him for a few years, was familiar with his family background. Anton was asked to read the story The Happy Prince to himself. The discussion took place in my home a few hours later. (See Appendix for the transcribed interview.)

The Reading Experience of a Single Child

"It made me feel sad." These are the words of an eight year old in describing the story of The Happy Prince. Well, so much for that. Language arts teachers would readily accept such evaluation of Oscar Wilde's popular tale. And from here other questions might ensue: about the plot of the story, the plight of its main characters and possibly about the difficult concept of "sacrifice" which lends the story its sad rendering.

But more often than not such pedagogic procedure, although worthwhile for its own purpose, does not lead to a deeper understanding of the reading experience of the child. It is not enough to conclude that this reading experience confronts the child with a sad story. Rather we must probe for the lived sense of Anton's response, "It made me feel sad." The Happy Prince is not just a sad story: it confronts Anton with something more profound, the reading experience brings him into the presence of sadness itself. Indeed "sadness" is not just a

word that qualifies the tenor of a story or the modality of an experience. It is misleading, therefore, to accept simply Anton's words as a child's evaluation of a fairy tale. Because in Anton's words there are hidden possible worlds: worlds lived through and worlds to live through.

To be sure Anton explains his sadness with thoughts ". . . about the beggars and about the two children and about the little girl who's going to get beaten if she doesn't bring any pennies home or anything and stuff like that . . ." There is no doubt that Anton shows us that eight year olds can be moved by powerful forces of fellow-feeling; so much so that he immediately is reminded of the personal need to deal with the emotionally unsettling quality of such feelings: "And that's what happens to me in stories like if something sad happens I know that it's not true, but I still feel, you know, I still feel sad even though I know that it's not true."

When we seriously, but haltingly, begin to explore with Anton the experience of reading The Happy Prince it becomes evident almost immediately that the line between the world of The Happy Prince and the world of Anton is only an artificial one. And this is not so because the eight year old child does not know how to distinguish between his own world and the world of fairy tales. Such would be non-sense. The line is artificial since asking questions about the story which Anton read, immediately become questions which just as well could have been asked of Anton. And such is the hermeneutics of the reading experience. When we read a story which is not simply or trivially sad but which makes it possible for us to experience the presence of sadness itself

then the relation of reader and text, life and story tends to surrender its subject-object dichotomy in favor of a more truly dialectic relationship. The story of the life of the fairy tale and the story of the life of Anton interpenetrate and lose themselves into each other.

When asked who was his favorite character in the story, Anton replied without hesitation, "The swallow." But why the swallow? Why not the Happy Prince? And Anton explains, "It's sort of like being a little kid and liking Superman—a big Super Hero and it's sort of like liking Jesus too because he helps somebody and that's why I like the swallow because he sacrificed, he died, and I felt sorry for him and I like him." As we see from Anton's story, this reading experience was more than a touching or vicarious reliving of a tale. The story brought Anton face to face with the question of how life should be lived. When time and again the little swallow is persuaded to postpone flying south for yet another day, and time is running out for the little bird in the onset of the killing winter winds, then at a deep emotional level the young reader of the story is permitted a profoundly human life experience. It is the question, what to make of one's life. "What I would have done if I were the swallow is like I would have given—well, no I wouldn't have. I would have just—about a few hours before I would have died, I would have flied out and I wouldn't have, you know, I might have put about three rubies to some people and only twelve pieces of gold on, no I wouldn't have finished it all. I'd go before I'd die. I wouldn't stay there." Of course this does not mean that, as reader Anton has identified himself so much with the world of the story, he can no longer see it as "only" a possible one. When

Anton is asked whether he, like the swallow, would have sacrificed himself for the Prince's cause, we hear him give us a most appropriate answer. However, the interesting feature of the answer is, that it looks like a thought-in-the-making. Obviously, the answer does not belong to the reading experience itself. While reading, Anton did not apparently ask himself what he would have done if he were the swallow. While reading the story, there is no need for that question. However, when Anton is asked what he would have done, he needs to think it through.

At the level of the reading experience the ideas of fellowship, sacrifice or love are not reduced to "mere" conceptualizations or categorizations, but rather they are experienced in all the deep existential complexities which belong to the ante-predicative realm of lived experience itself.

Then the Swallow came back to the Prince, 'You are blind now,' he said, 'so I will stay with you always.'

'No, little Swallow,' said the poor Prince, 'you must go away to Egypt.'

'I will stay with you always,' said the Swallow, and he slept at the Prince's feet. (1968, p. 20)

It is for this reason too, that the reading experience of a child cannot be understood out of context of the linguistic material which provides for this particular reading experience in the first place. Sadness for Anton is a way of being, much like being scared; it brings with it confusing, partly tacit and partly articulated senses of reckoning and dealing with it—in the story as well as in his own life:

"Like if I have a nightmare and this racing car was going by and no one was driving it and it seems quite funny but it is quite

scary to me. So I tried to picture Donald Duck in it but it didn't help. And that's what happens to me in stories like if something sad happens I know that it's not true, but I still feel, you know, I still feel sad even though I know it's not true. . . . It just helps me feel, like, not scared and, you know, like not be sorry and not start crying in my bed and everything so I try to picture it. I try to make myself you know tell myself it's not true, force myself to not think about it, as being true."

How strikingly does Anton relay the power of language; that it can do things to you much like dreams can. And then you try to deal with it by taking distance and tell yourself that "it is only a dream" or "it is only a story." But some dreams and some stories are such (so real), that an easy escape by dismissal won't do. And fighting back tears, not crying, seems a recurring battle in Anton's life.

What do we make of this as educators? The point is that most of the time we don't make anything of it at all. And that is because in our language arts teacher guides we are encouraged to be creative, yes, relate the story to the personal experience of children, yes, but the problem, of course, is that this cannot be done prescriptively, by way of a structured set of preordained questions—no matter how pedagogically sensitive the makers of language arts programs happen to be. The question "What do we make of this?" really asks what do we make of ourselves? How do we indeed manage to show that we are pedagogues by our sensibility to interpret in concrete the experience of sadness for this child, Anton?—by interpreting what possible worlds

are created in the dialogic encounter of Anton's life story and the story of The Happy Prince? Another, more conventional way of saying this is that curricular pedagogy is profoundly moral. Via our subject matter of language arts we are deeply involved in the lives of the children we teach. But, if we teach literature without "seeing" the possible worlds it invites the children to live through and, if we ourselves lack a vision of how a life is to be lived, then what we make of a child's reading experience is a flattened and shallow interpretation when it calls for something thoughtful and more profound. To read means to live through a story, and to live through it in such a way that the story is indeed your story. Hence, Anton can say how sadly he feels about the swallow's death. Indeed, a story like this may be an occasion when you have to press back tears, or tell yourself that, after all, it is just a story and you don't want to cry.

There is a section in Oscar Wilde's story where a grade five or six teacher who shares stories like this with her children knows that children will inadvertently show tell-tales of what they make of the experience. It is here that a furtive glance will reveal an attentive stillness in the look of some children and a snicker on the faces of other children. It is at the moment when there is mention of "the kiss on the lips" that almost invariably a budding self-consciousness about things erotic or sexual will for some children break the spell of the story.

The poor little Swallow grew colder and colder, but he would not leave the Prince, he loved him too well. He picked up crumbs outside the baker's door when the baker was not looking, and tried to keep himself warm by flapping his wings.

But at last he knew that he was going to die. He had just enough strength to fly up to the Prince's shoulder once more. 'Good-bye, dear Prince!' he murmured, 'will you let me kiss your hand?'

'I am glad that you are going to Egypt at last, little Swallow,' said the Prince, 'you have stayed too long here, but you must kiss me on the lips, for I love you.'

'It is not to Egypt that I am going,' said the Swallow. 'I am going to the House of Death. Death is the brother of Sleep, is he not?'

And he kissed the Happy Prince on the lips, and fell down dead at his feet. (1968, p. 22)

Not only should a teacher know what a reading experience like this may mean for a child, the teacher should also be able to say that Anton is a lucky boy to be able to read this way! Or possibly that Anton is so sensitive that it is necessary to dwell with him on the notion of happiness in order to help show him that happiness is at least as real an experience as sadness. In other words, to make something of a child's reading experience is to be able to interpret the ontology of the experience. The teacher must be able to recognize how the poetry of language can call forth something that in a sense is undefinable, although it is real enough that it can engender a host of meaningful significances which belong to the life-world of a child. Another way of saying this is that, thanks to language we can experience the world poetically, which means that in the presence of sadness (made real by the love of the swallow's kiss) as well as in the presence of happiness we can feel "beautiful," as Anton did. To have a sense of the ontological means that the teacher can interpret the meaning of such reading experience in the life-world of a particular child.

Chapter VII

CONCLUSION

Summary

This study grew out of personal classroom experiences of reading with and to children literary material which seemed to engage them generally with questions, feelings and concerns of a moral kind. How can these language arts experiences be better understood? How may teachers who value such experiences inquire into the nature of this curriculum concern? In order to deal with such questions the over-riding problem statement of this study became, "How can children's literature be analyzed in the way that it may provide for moral growth in the child's reading experience?" In the approach taken for addressing the problem statement six subordinate questions were formulated. The six questions allowed the study to adopt a shifting focus, setting out with a predominantly conceptual, empirical frame and ending with a more interpretive, phenomenological perspective.

In order to project conceptual meaning onto the notion of moral growth, four approaches were initially examined which might serve to carry analytic strength to the interpretive task of the thesis study. These four approaches were: the values clarification approach, the moral-developmental approach, the rational approach, and the moral-emotional approach. All four approaches claim to deal with valuing concerns by engaging students in should and ought questions,

and questions dealing with judgments of what is good or bad, right or wrong. Such questions were broadly seen to fall in the domain of moral growth experiences. Each approach could be related to a basic model, a theoretic framework, and to certain teaching-learning aims, needs, processes and outcomes. The various approaches were discussed in terms of their strengths and shortcomings. One serious shortcoming from the perspective of the basic interest of this study was the relativistic and ideological character of all the approaches. The moral-emotional approach seemed to suffer least from this criticism.

Next, the idea of "orienting clue structures" was developed in order to gain an interpretive leverage of the four moral growth approaches. The orienting clue structure was not envisaged as a one dimensional instrument for application to content analysis but rather as a way of orienting or attuning oneself (much as a literary critic would do) to any piece of children's literature in order to review and interpret a book for its potential of providing the young reader with an opportunity to enjoy a moral growth experience. The four orienting clue structures were sketched then by way of brief schematic outlines—clues to keep in mind as one involves oneself in the interpretation of the pedagogic significance of selected children's books.

Four books were chosen to show how the orienting clue structures might be seen to yield interpretive descriptions. Judy Blume's Are You There God? It's Me Margaret, Paula Fox's The Slave Dancer, Betsy Byar's The Midnight Fox, and Oscar Wilde's The Happy Prince were selected on the basis of their literary quality, their popularity with

young readers and their appropriateness for the upper elementary school age child. Each book was selected, more or less intuitively, on the basis of a tacit sense of the clue structure which constitutes an illustrative understanding of the different theories of moral growth.

The descriptions which ensued were constructed fairly smoothly, succinctly, and suggestive of the thesis that different children's books may indeed prove to contain a certain emphasis or interpretive structure which makes it plausible that the young reader would vicariously be able to enjoy a certain kind of moral growth experience. Apart from a sketch of the story and a clue structure analysis, pedagogical considerations were formulated to show how each book has certain pedagogical value and how a teacher might be able to help particular children in her classroom with advising such literature to serve the child's interests and pedagogic needs. It was suggested that the application of the idea of clue structures to children's literature is an attempt to do more systematically something that good teachers already do on a more intuitive and less formal level. The contribution of orienting clue structure analyses, such as performed in this study, was thought to lie especially in the process of bringing to reflective awareness and to language what teachers otherwise may or may not be able to articulate for themselves.

A discussion of Scheler's work on the phenomenon of empathy as a key notion in the understanding of moral emotional growth was offered against an exploration of the existing conceptual, empirical research literature on empathy. The empirical research findings seem to be readily classifiable into three categorical frameworks, depending on

the underlying assumptions about the origins and genesis of empathy in human behavior. However, common to all three perspectives is that they all strive for a form of knowledge which aims for technical practical control of the reading experience rather than for a deeper understanding of what the meaning of the experience consists of. The phenomenological approach to empathy attempts to interpret the meaning aspects of the structure of empathy as experienced in everyday life.

However, it was argued also that, in the end, the conceptual distinctions among four moral growth models and their applications to children's literature were still only abstractions from real life experiences. In order to pursue a fuller understanding of the way a reading experience may provide the child with an opportunity for experiencing moral growth, both the experience of moral growth and the experience of an actual reading of a story should be further examined for their essential qualities. The phenomenological perspective was adopted for deepening out an understanding of the phenomenon of having a moral emotional experience and the same perspective was adopted for investigating the nature of the reading experiences of children who read the story The Happy Prince by Oscar Wilde. It was suggested that empathic fellow-feeling in a phenomenological sense does not ignore the child's subjectivity. Understanding empathy phenomenologically might help the language arts teacher to interpret the inner experiences of the child and assist the child in coming to terms with and transcending the constraints that stand in the way of a reflective and autonomous passage toward responsible adulthood. It was posed that phenomenology may add to an educator's practical

competence by bringing the pedagogic significance of empathy to reflective awareness.

In the final part of the study the question of the phenomenology of the reading experience of the child was investigated both theoretically and by way of an illustrative example. The chapter concerned itself with the question of what a reading experience is like for a child, or more specifically what it is like for a young child to read a fairy tale of an emotional moral kind. It was posed that existing theories of the nature of the reading experience of the child are of a thematic sort while the type of theorizing needed to pursue the reading experience is of a non-thematic character, aiming to recover somehow the essential nature of the reading experience as lived through by the child. In this sense phenomenology is the project of a constant turning back to the world of lived experience—and thereby, actively resisting the temptation of thematizing this experience by reducing it to models or conceptual abstractions. The implication for this study was seen to lie in the recognition that to read is to have an experience with language and that, therefore, it was necessary to consider the question of language. Another implication of the study involved the recognition that to read always is to read something. To understand the nature of the reading experience of a particular child is to get to know the child and to come to know what the place of this story is in the life of the child.

In group discussions with children who had just read Oscar Wilde's The Happy Prince it was seen how the quality of the responsiveness of the children differed depending on the way they were oriented

to the reading of the story. One of the questions raised by reflecting on this exercise was whether as educators we really know what we mean when we say that we have selected certain learning experiences, or whether for that matter we know what it means to say that a child has a certain learning experience.

Finally, the illustration of the reading experience of a single child became an example for showing how the idea of moral growth and the nature of the reading experience are always tied in to very specific happenings and concerns in the life-world of the child. It showed how, via the subject matter of language arts, teachers are deeply involved in the lives of the children they teach. If, as teachers, we teach literature without seeing the possible worlds it invites the children to live through and, if we ourselves lack a vision of how a life is to be lived, then what we make of a child's reading experience is a flattened and shallow interpretation when it calls for something thoughtful and more profound.

Implications for Curriculum

This study was not undertaken in the hope of discovering or developing more effective teaching-learning methods for the language arts reading program of the elementary school curriculum. Rather, the study aimed to investigate how the question of the nature of the moral growth experience of a selected piece of children's literature could be pursued. The evolving idea of orienting clue structures and their various theoretical and practical interpretive functions are the main contributions of the study. Having stated the limiting purpose of the

study, some implications for curriculum may now be drawn.

1. There seems to be a trade-off in the more or less practical returns (in a technical or instrumental sense) derived from any study of this kind, depending on the degree to which the approach of the study aligns itself with a more conceptual, empirical or a more non-thematic, phenomenological orientation respectively.

2. Once a teacher understands the theoretical contexts of the clue structures as outlined in this study, these clue structures may prove to be helpful in the planning, the teaching and in the diagnostic stages of the classroom curriculum.

- a. The analytic device of a clue structure may serve to help teachers in selecting and interpreting books that contain a moral growth component.

- b. Books which provide children with cathartic language experiences may be identified and made available for students to read or for teachers to include in their literature programs.

- c. A clue structure may help teachers to orient to the uniqueness of each child and identify what issues and concerns should be dealt with in questions and discussion of a reading lesson.

3. A phenomenological analysis of the meaning of "moral emotional growth" suggests that a fuller and more thoughtful grasp by teachers of common educational concepts (values learning, affective objectives, moral development, etc.) should be encouraged as part of the curriculum development process. Too easily we set out to plan certain "learning experiences" without really knowing in any deeper sense what such experiences consist of. In other words, teachers

themselves should be willing to think deeply on common educational language use—words which now have become shallow, trite, cut loose from the lived human reality from which they were originally derived.

4. Any reading exercise in the elementary school curriculum is always more than a mere exercise for developing of a reading skill; it is always a particular reading experience for a particular child. Teachers should select reading material always with a view of the possible quality of reading experience provided by the material.

5. Any reading experience is always a reading experience of a single child. The reading component of the language arts curriculum should go well beyond the now seemingly prevailing practices associated with the reader's workbook exercises. On the part of the teacher this requires considerable pedagogic tact—a tactfulness of knowing how to mediate between the provisional learning experiences of a reading text and the personal and possible experiences of the life-world of each child.

Recommendations for Further Research

In order to further our understanding of the fundamental subject of this thesis it is recommended that:

1. The meaning and interpretive function of orienting clue structure be further developed and experimented with. Only a beginning has been made in this study to develop the idea of "orienting clue structure" in the interpretive process of children's literature and curriculum work. The challenge is to describe the idea of "orienting clue structure" in such a way so as not to slide back into an

instrumentalist formulation of a positivistic "tool" for content analysis, interaction analysis, or other more systems oriented notions.

2. The validity of the concept of "orienting clue structure" be corroborated in the present or modified form. Additional sources of children's literature could be examined for the way in which they might provide for moral growth (or other such) experiences.

3. Additional work with individual or small groups of children be carried out in order to further describe the structures of the child's reading experience.

Concluding Statement

As Husserl might have said, to read is always to read something. If ever we cut off the act of reading from what is being read, neither the reading act nor the reading (text) can be adequately understood. As we judge children's literature by way of orienting clue structures, or as we probe aspects of the reading process, neither focus will provide true insight into the lived reality of the reading experience. The language arts teacher always needs to attempt to understand any reading experience in terms of its meaning and place in the total life-world of the child.

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APPENDIX
INTERVIEW TRANSCRIPT

INTERVIEW TRANSCRIPT

Portions of the transcript of my interview with Anton are preceded by relevant passages from Oscar Wilde's, The Happy Prince.

Discussion of experience of sadness:

'In the square below,' said the Happy Prince, 'there stands a little match-girl. She has let her matches fall in the gutter, and they are all spoiled. Her father will beat her if she does not bring home some money, and she is crying. She has no shoes or stockings, and her little head is bare. Pluck out my other eye, and give it to her, and her father will not beat her.'

'I will stay with you one night longer,' said the Swallow, but I cannot pluck out your eye. You would be quite blind then.'

'Swallow, Swallow, little Swallow,' said the Prince, 'do as I command you.'

So he plucked out the Prince's other eye, and darted down with it. He swooped past the match-girl, and slipped the jewel into the palm of her hand. 'What a lovely bit of glass!' cried the little girl; and she ran home, laughing.

. . . So the Swallow flew over the great city, and saw the rich making merry in their beautiful homes, while the beggars were sitting at the gates. He flew into dark lanes, and saw the white faces of starving children looking out listlessly at the black streets. Under the archway of a bridge two little boys were lying in one another's arms to try and keep themselves warm. 'How hungry we are!' they said. 'You must not lie here,' shouted the watchman, and they wandered out into the rain. (pp. 20-21)

I: Did you feel there were any sad moments in the story?

A: Well, ah—about the beggars and about the two children and about the little girl who's going to get beaten if she doesn't bring any pennies home or anything and stuff like that and that's about it.

I: Can you say anything more about this?

A: Well to me like if I watch a program and I have a nightmare and this racing car was going by and no one was driving it and it

seems quite funny but it is quite scary to me. So I tried to picture Donald Duck in it but it didn't help. And that's what happens to me in stories like if something sad happens I know that it's not true, but I still feel, you know, I still feel sad even though I know that it's not true.

I: But are you afraid of not letting your true sadness come through? Would you rather not let yourself get really sad? Is that why you put Donald Duck in the racing car?

A: No. It just helps me feel like not scared and you know like not be sorry and not start crying in my bed and everything so I try to picture it. I try and make myself, you know, tell myself it's not true, force myself to not think about it as being true.

I: M-m-m.

. . .

I: Of all the characters in the story, who was your favorite?

A: The swallow.

I: And of course I'll ask you why. Why the swallow, why not the happy Prince?

A: Well (laughs). It's sort of like being a little kid and liking Superman—a big super hero and it's sort of like liking Jesus too because he helps somebody and that's why I like the swallow because he sacrificed, he died, and I felt sorry for him and I like him.

I: What about the happy Prince? He was removing all this glorious stuff off of his body and giving it to the poor. Isn't that sort of a sacrifice?

A: Well, yes. But it's not as if he's going to die. It's just a

fairy tale and you know in the daytime I don't like to think about this. It's not like he is a person just standing there stiff and he can't move. So no, I like the swallow the best.

Discussion of experience of sacrifice:

Then the Swallow came back to the Prince, 'You are blind now,' he said, 'so I will stay with you always.'

'No, little Swallow,' said the poor Prince, 'you must go away to Egypt.'

'I will stay with you always,' said the Swallow, and he slept at the Prince's feet. (p. 20)

I: I was wondering about one part of the story. If you were a swallow, if you could put yourself in the place of the bird (which is hard to do)

A: M-m-m—Yeh.

I: But if you could picture for a moment that you were that little swallow, would you do the same thing? Would you stay with the Prince and be his messenger rather than fly off to Egypt when you knew that you were going to die if you stayed through the winter?

A: Well, what I would do is you know, well, I didn't really understand part of it, like—oh yeh. What I would have done is like I would have given—well, no I wouldn't have. I would have just—about a few hours before I would have died, I would have flied out and I wouldn't have, you know, I might have put about three rubies to some people and only twelve pieces of gold on, no I wouldn't have finished it all. I'd go before I'd die. I wouldn't stay there.

I: That's what we call sacrifice, when you give up your life—

A: Yes.

I: for someone or something else. In your life

A: Yes

I: In the seven or eight years that you've been alive is there anything you can think of that you've done that is sacrificial, that you've sacrificed yourself for, not really in your life but something you really want, but you said no, I'm not going to take it. Instead I'm going to do this for so and so. Can you think of anything?

A: (Pause) Yes.

I: (Laughs)

A: Well, at school sometimes you know—there's this boy in my class called Greg. You know you have big fights with grade fivers and he usually wins. And the grade fivers get really mad and they start chasing after him and everything. And I could not go. You know I'm not in this and I'm not out of it and I was going to go and play with my other friends and not be in the fight cause then I might get hurt. And then I decided that it might be fun (laughter) like I might be a hero if I survive. So I went in.

I: And what happened?

A: Well (laughs) I got in a few fights with them.

I: Did you get hurt physically?

A: No, I didn't.

I: But you were scared—

A: Well, only if they get on top of the group, but usually they don't

really get you. Usually someone who is scared can run faster than someone who's just chasing them (laughs).

I: Why is that?

A: Cause like the person who is scared is running for their life but with the person who's chasing them, you know, it's not as if they have to go as fast as they can, waste all their energy and everything and like they're not really going as fast but the scared person knows where he's going.

I: So it's more important for you when you're scared. It seems as though you are saying that being frightened or being scared also is a part of sacrificing.

A: Yes.

I: You know it's sort of overcoming a fear.

A: Yes. But if you're not really in it and not really out like you could lose something else instead of it but if you have to stay in it then that's sacrificing because no one's forcing you.

I: You are making a choice. Is that what you're saying?

A: Yes.

I: Do you ever do this at home with your family—make a choice to do something that you'd much rather not do and yet you sacrifice your own feelings and wishes—

A: No, no, not really. No I do, you know, I do a lot of nice stuff that like it's not like I was saying like I really wouldn't get hurt or anything if I was doing that and I wouldn't really have a choice you know. Just doing something nice like carrying a chair outside or something like that. It's not really sacrificing. No,

I wouldn't do that at home.

I: It doesn't compare to what the swallow did by giving up his life.

A: No, no.

Discussion of experience of love:

The poor little Swallow grew colder and colder, but he would not leave the Prince, he loved him too well. He picked up crumbs outside the baker's door when the baker was not looking, and tried to keep himself warm by flapping his wings.

But at last he knew that he was going to die. He had just enough strength to fly up to the Prince's shoulder once more. 'Good-bye, dear Prince!' he murmured, 'will you let me kiss your hand?'

'I am glad that you are going to Egypt at last, little Swallow,' said the Prince, 'you have stayed too long here, but you must kiss me on the lips, for I love you.'

'It is not to Egypt that I am going,' said the Swallow. 'I am going to the House of Death. Death is the brother of Sleep, is he not?'

And he kissed the Happy Prince on the lips, and fell down dead at his feet. (p. 22)

I: I wonder what kids think about this. The Prince says, "You have stayed too long here; but you must kiss me on the lips, for I love you." How does this affect you when you read something like this?

A: It makes me feel sort of—sad.

I: What do you think the Prince means by "I love you." I mean, this is something you hear a lot—in the movies, for example.

A: Yes, I know. But I sort of heard this story before. And I know that the bird's going to die. And when I heard that, like the Prince says I love you and he's going to die—you know—it's sort of like a love story like in the war or something like that. I feel sad.

Discussion of experience of power:

Early the next morning the Mayor was walking in the square below in company with the Town Councillors. As they passed the column he looked up at the statue: 'Dear me! How shabby the Happy Prince looks!' he said.

'How shabby, indeed!' cried the Town Councillors, who always agreed with the Mayor: and they went up to look at it.

'The ruby has fallen out of his sword, his eyes are gone, and he is golden no longer,' said the Mayor; 'in fact, he is little better than a beggar!'

'Little better than a beggar,' said the Town Councillors.
(p. 25)

I: What did you think of the mayor and the town councillors?

A: I thought that they were quite dumb—stupid. I sometimes laughed—laughed inside, in my head.

I: At what particular thing?

A: At, you know (pause) Well, just one particular part of the story. It's sort of like a cartoon. And like there'd be—like Gilligan's Island. Like someone is serious and someone repeats and it's sort of dumb and that's Gilligan. It's sort of like that.

I: Oh. So when the mayor said, uh, "I think we should get rid of this statue. It's looking shabby" and the town councillors say, "Yes, yes, we must get rid of the statue."

A: (Laughs)

I: Do you think the town councillors are saying this just because they are dumb? Do you think there may be another reason the town councillors agree so quickly with the mayor?

A: Yes. He is the mayor and they're not really like policemen and the mayor could throw them in jail and do something like that.

I: Have you ever met people who agree with whatever the leader of the group says just to be—

A: Yes.

I: Can you give me an example?

A: My friend Demian. He's four years old. If I say anything you know I'm bigger and I can beat up boys you know six years old. I'm two years older than the bullies but the bullies are two years older than Demian. So he thinks that I'm so brave. He always listens. "My hero!" (laughs)

I: How does it make you feel?

A: It makes me feel sort of nice like a hero. I like having somebody always on my back—you know, counting on me.

I: Could we call this power?

A: Yes.

I: So you sort of have power in a situation like this one. Do you know anyone you consider a hero in the same way that Demian looks up to you? Someone you'd do almost anything for?

A: No. No one that I can think of. There are people that I try to be like but no, not really, there isn't.

I: What kinds of people would you like to be like?

A: I have a cousin Antony. And I'd like to be almost one thousand super heros (laughs). Well, not really.

I: What kinds of things would you like to be able to do that you can't do now?

A: Well, I—well I know I can picture what it will be like with electric cars and everything. You know I want to be alive then. I'd rather be dead now than dead then.

Discussion on experiences of happiness and rejection:

High above the city, on a tall column, stood the statue of the Happy Prince. He was gilded all over with thin leaves of fine gold, for eyes he had two bright sapphires, and a large red ruby glowed on his sword-hilt.

He was very much admired indeed.

. . . 'Why can't you be like the Happy Prince?' asked a sensible mother of her little boy who was crying for the moon. 'The Happy Prince never dreams of crying for anything.' (p. 13)

. . . 'When I was alive and had a human heart,' answered the statue, 'I did not know what tears were, for I lived in the Palace of Sans-Souci, where sorrow is not allowed to enter. In the daytime I played with my companions in the garden, and in the evening I led the dance in the Great Hall. Round the garden ran a very lofty wall, but I never cared to ask what lay beyond it, everything about me was so beautiful. My courtiers called me the Happy Prince, and happy indeed I was, if pleasure be happiness.' (p. 15)

I: Why do you think the story was called The Happy Prince even though it contained many sad moments?

A: Because at first well before—before the Prince was alive we saw that part too and he was happy standing there.

I: What does the word "happy" mean? It's a word we use a lot. What does happiness mean to you personally?

A: It means something nice. You're doing something nice, going some place nice, having a nice day.

I: You use the word nice a lot. How do you feel inside?

A: It makes me feel "nice" (laughs).

I: What's a really happy time you can remember that makes you feel nice, that makes you feel warm inside?

A: Um. The first time I made a friend.

I: Tell me about that. It sounds neat.

A: Well I lived in Parkallen. And I just moved in a few days, a few weeks ago, two weeks ago and I didn't have a friend and we saw all these kids running around and stuff and my dad said "go over!" But then I was really shy and I said, "I will not go over there" and then finally someone from there came over to my house and asked me to play. And so I really felt—you know—beautiful.

I: Why were you hesitant about going over to the group?

A: Well, like it's sort of like bullies. If they don't like you they'll say "get out of here, don't come here!" I try to avoid that so I don't go and say "Hi" and play.

I: So this fellow came over and asked you to play. Were you friends immediately?

A: Yes. His name was Jason. I haven't seen him in a year because we moved.

I: I know. What kinds of qualities do you think a friend should have? You probably have reasons why one person is a better friend than another person.

A: Because one might be kinder, one might depend on you like I was saying and one might do what you want and always agree with you so you don't get in big arguments.

I: What kind of behavior do you have to show in considering yourself a good friend?

A: I want to be nice. I want to be kind and I never show myself crying.

I: Why is that?

A: Cause they will all think I am a little baby (laughs) you know.

I: Sometimes it's really hard not to cry. I have that problem and I'm much much older than you. I see something that moves me and the tears start coming (laughs).

A: (Laughs)

I: I wonder why in our society people think you are much stronger if you don't cry.

A: It's sort of like bullies. "Cry baby, cry baby!" (sings) You know—I'm not going to cry!"

I: So you remember experiences from your past.

A: Yes. Before I had those friends who lived in the apartments, there were lots of bullies around and they—you know—and one time they pushed me around and I landed and I hurt my nose really bad and I started crying and they started calling me, "Cry Baby, Cry Baby!" I remember that. No, I'm not going to cry.

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